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Mr. Nixon's Urban Ballet

HAMILTON E. DAVIS

The Glenville Shoot-Out

Bad Day In Cleveland

ROLDO BARTIMOLE

Anti-Union Hospitals

BLUE CROSS PAYS THE BILLS JOEL SELDIN

China in Our High Schools ORVILLE SCHELL

MARK L. KRUPNICK *on Henry James*

JOAN GOULIANOS *on Lawrence Durrell*

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LETTERS

faith of the New Left

Koch, Mo.

DEAR SIRS: Your issues of June 16 and 23 contained two important discussions of the New Left: the paper on Marcuse by Peter Clecak and the review of Christopher Lasch by John McDermott.

In these, as well as in everything else that I have read concerning the various radical movements, there is one puzzling feature, i.e., the omission of the question of "ends" that the revolutionary movements are seeking. . . .

We do have a bit of history to teach us. Many important pieces of real estate are now in the hands of revolutionary Marxists, and other points on the globe are controlled by other brands of socialism. Is it not germane to "look at the records" of these lands? How does the performance match the promise? Is there more—or less—chauvinism in Russia, in China, in Poland, in North Vietnam? Is there now no imperialism practiced by the "liberated" nations? Is man's spirit and dignity freer and more respected anywhere in the lands where the revolutionary movements were guided by Marxist doctrine? An answer to these rhetorical questions is hardly necessary, but is the New Left aware of the lesson to be drawn? . . .

If the New Left is not to copy the Russian model, or the Chinese—what blueprint or design *do* they have? If none, is it at all rational to proceed toward the destruction of a structure without any notion as to what is to replace it? Shall we trust that through some mystical process a program will somehow develop as we go along? That would surely place a heavy burden on faith. . . .

Albert Kaplan, M.D.

finger on Dr. King

Woods Hole, Mass.

DEAR SIRS: I wonder whether there was not more to the "dirty business" of the Martin Luther King surveillance than the fact and the timing of this outrage. Many of us have no doubt been surprised that the confessed murderer of Dr. King not only had plenty of money but that he must also have had good sources of intelligence regarding Dr. King's plans. The telephone tap would have provided such information to the operatives on the job. Mr. Hoover and his superiors (if there be any) owe to us and to history the assurance that none of the knowledge gained in the course of the wire tap was leaked to the murderer or to the accomplices that he now claims to have had.

Harry Grundfest

reporters' passions

New York City

DEAR SIRS: Elmer Bendiner writing about John Reed ["The Troubadour of Revolution," *The Nation,* June 30] is irritating as hell. "Yet how much we need men of Reed's passionate intelligence and tender eye at work for us in Vietnam and China and Cuba!" he exclaims, and overlooks a horde of us who may not claim one tender eye but who have written about these countries with intelligence and concern for their peoples. The literature on these countries' revolutionary struggles by American writers is not only voluminous but of so high an order that Reed may at best be called a precursor. The truth is not that today "technology weights the odds against the reporters who write passionately of human beings" but that technology's crimes (as in Vietnam) have aroused writers to write more movingly (take only the example of Jonathan Schell) than Reed ever did. . . .

Jose Yglesias

EDITORIALS

Who Is Nixon?

Chalmers M. Roberts writes in *The Washington Post* that no man reaches the White House on his own by other than "a vast balancing act designed to produce enough votes from America's heterogeneous population," and no one stays there except by the same means. Almost everyone will agree, but when Mr. Roberts extends it to the Knowles episode he is on unsure ground. In this and several other actions since he has been in office, Mr. Nixon has exceeded the norms of political expediency to such a degree that the most cynical analysts of government are left wondering whether he is a single, unified personality, or several at conflict with one another. To some extent Mr. Roberts shares these doubts, for in his opening paragraph he cites the trite question, "Will the real Richard Nixon please stand up?" and tries to answer it.

That the question is so persistently raised, and so unsuccessfully answered, is a political phenomenon in itself. Lyndon B. Johnson, by default and by action, produced a "crisis of credibility" which reached such proportions that, long before he left office, it had become irremediable. People did not know when to believe him and when not to believe him, but this did not blur the impression of the man himself. He showed a consistency in his deviousness and left no doubt that he knew who he was and would continue to be just that. The same could be said of John F. Kennedy and of Truman and Eisenhower. One never read feature stories about the "New Truman" or the "New Eisenhower," or speculations as to how much was old and how much new about either.

Nixon, on the other hand, has a real identity problem and one suspects that it is something more basic, and potentially more troublesome, than the zigzagging that is an indispensable component of a top-flight political career. Combined with canniness and a high order of skill in pretending to candor where he most wishes to avoid it, there is a strange uncertainty about the role in which he visualizes himself. This chameleon trait, which can no more be hidden than the histrionic grin, has given rise to the vexations about the "real Nixon," the "new Nixon," the "old Nixon," the "new-old Nixon," and all the other variations on the theme.

These speculations are quite justified; hardly anything could be more important than the subjective aspect of Presidential decision making. The unknown quantities in Mr. Nixon's character show up in foreign policy, as in the decision to visit Romania prior to a disarmament conference with the Russians, and in a general unevenness on which Senator Javits has commented. "He's back and forth," Javits says, "and it's been a very spotty performance. He hasn't made up his mind who he is. There is doubt who is in the ascendancy at a given moment. . . ."

This description hints at a partial explanation—a divided Republican Party whose leader, like a circus equestrian, tries to ride two horses which are kept going in the same general direction only by ties of expediency. But in

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relation to the Knowles case this hypothesis does not take one very far. Secretary Finch was the President's chief credential as a half-liberal executive. The feeling was that with such a man administering Health, Education and Welfare the Cabinet could not be altogether bad. Moreover, Mr. Finch was reputed to be Mr. Nixon's best friend and a protégé of whom Mr. Nixon could be proud. If Dr. Knowles had been appointed soon after Mr. Nixon took office there would have been no difficulty in securing not only confirmation but general approbation. The American Medical Association and Senator Dirksen could not possibly damage Mr. Nixon as seriously as he has damaged himself by keeping Finch and Knowles on the hook for five and a half months, allowing Finch to tell the reporters that Knowles was sure of appointment, then switching at the last minute to a generally similar candidate, and in the process embarrassing Finch so severely that even his enemies now sympathize with him.

The American people are not ill-natured in their attitude toward their President, however he has come to the office. They will tolerate—have tolerated—many mistakes, ascribing them to the difficulties of the office rather than the failings of the man. They do, however, expect the President to be a person of definable character. If they get the feeling that he is ruled entirely by expediency, that he has no convictions which merit their respect, they will turn against him as, for other reasons, they turned against Mr. Johnson. On this basis, Mr. Nixon has a problem on his hands that transcends the problems of inflation, the cities, Vietnam, and all others, for it affects everything that comes to him for decision. And Mr. Nixon's problem is the problem of every one of us.

Fair Dartmouth

Hanover, N.H.

For the instruction of other administrators confronted by dissent, Dartmouth's trustees have just celebrated their college's bicentennial with a wonderful demonstration of the worst ways to proceed. Most of the forty students whom they tossed to the courts of New Hampshire by the injunction route (see "The Injunction on Campus," *The Nation,* June 9) had completed their thirty-day sentences just in time to welcome the Earl of Dartmouth and his lady on June 14, but some were still behind bars when the faculty members who had gone along in the student seizure of Parkhurst Hall faced trial on June 23 and 24 before the faculty Committee Advisory to the President.

It was quite a show. Paul Knapp, visiting associate professor of chemistry, and Dona Strauss, assistant professor of mathematics—advised by the dean to resign—had retained the formidable William Kunstler to guide their appeal under academic due process. The administrators panicked and confronted Kunstler with the father-and-son team of Kenneth F. and John A. Graf, acting for the trustees, with a third attorney to backstop the legal amateurs of the faculty committee. The press was suddenly excluded, over bitter defense objections, from what promptly became an adversary proceeding. A scatter-

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shot charge was soon narrowed to "gross personal misconduct," in the face of extremely strong support for both teachers from their departments.

Interchangeable, Graf and Graf set out to establish facts and to repel any notion that motive was relevant. When Kunstler objected to a Graf question, the committee chairman—a decent man trapped in an unsought routine—would consult his counsel and deny the defense objection; but prosecution objections were monotonously sustained, to exclude any hint that the seizure of Parkhurst Hall was a despairing protest against the continuing implication of the college in a wicked war through ROTC and military recruiting.

The prosecution hammered its allegations that Knapp had assisted in the ejection of Dean of Freshmen Dickerson from his office and had been photographed haranguing the rabble through the windows with a bull horn. Dickerson's own testimony revealed the uncertainty of his identification, and Knapp testified that he had used the bull horn only to read an official summary of President John Sloan Dickey's remarks on the merits of the injunction procedure.

On the second day it was clear that the committee, because of such episodes, had reassessed a ludicrous situation in which Graf Senior had sometimes addressed its chairman as "Your Honor." Prosecution objections began to be crisply denied. A graduate student, by a display of wordless astonishment, repelled the notion that he had been subverted by the political wiles of Mrs. Strauss. To Kunstler's eloquent summation, the factual Grafs chose not to respond at all.

What next? The committee has only an advisory function: the trustees, who could make jailbirds of forty boys under their care by letting a judge do it, must solve this one on their own—well aware that an observer for the AAUP is watching. ALEXANDER LAING

Contempt of Congress

If an alleged Communist refuses to answer the questions of a Congressional inquisitor, he is cited for contempt, prosecuted and almost inevitably sent to jail. He has interfered with the legislative process by refusing to furnish information, however trivial. But when officials in the Pentagon systematically deceive the Congress on a matter of the most vital national importance, no one is cited, no one is tried, no one is jailed. It is almost as if one of the unwritten privileges of the military were to spend their $80 billion a year allowance pretty much as they see fit, with only a minimum of accountability to Congress, and of course none at all to the public.

In the case of MIRV—the multiple warhead development, which is perhaps the most crucial issue before the country today—Rep. William S. Moorhead accuses the Pentagon of "willful concealment," and the record bears him out. Since 1962, the Air Force has been working on "penetration aids," costing to date about $1.5 billion. MIRV is only one element of this program. At the next level of detail, the Mark 12 General Electric re-entry vehicle has been an element of MIRV, but not an exclusive one. So far as the Congress was concerned, the whole MIRV program was still in the development stage and there was no connection between MIRV and Mark 12. Thus a routine Pentagon announcement, under date of July 10, 1968, that it had given General Electric a "letter contract" to produce sixty-eight Mark 12 re-entry vehicles attracted no Congressional attention.

On June 19 of this year, President Nixon told the country that he was considering asking the Russians to agree to a moratorium on further MIRV testing. Forty-one Senators lined up behind a "sense-of-the-Senate" resolution proposed by Senator Brooke, supporting a mutual test moratorium. But in the meantime, in April and May of this year, the Pentagon was engaged in negotiations with General Electric to convert the July 1968 letter of intent into a formal contract. This process was completed and the contract was signed on June 19—the very day on which Mr. Nixon was informing the reporters that he was considering trying to work out a standstill with the Russians. Contrary to its usual practice, the Pentagon did not announce the award. When Representative Moorhead expressed outrage, the Pentagon referred blandly to its letter of intent announcement of almost exactly a year earlier.

The General Electric contract is not for research and development (the kind of testing that the Congressmen wanted halted); apparently matters are well past that stage. It is a production contract for the top stage of Minuteman III ICBMs, which can then be equipped with three warheads in place of one. Up to fourteen missiles can be mounted on the submarine-borne Poseidon, successor to the Polaris. Their warheads are smaller than the single warheads of the older vehicles, but they are city-busters in the 50-200,000 kiloton range. For comparison, the bomb that leveled Hiroshima was of 25 kiloton size.

The basic idea is to quadruple the number of deliverable warheads and to target them accurately on every town or missile site. The Russians have not been idle in this laudable endeavor. Their line of development is aimed at fewer but larger warheads. U.S. intelligence is not certain whether the Soviet warheads are ejected in a shotgun pattern or are individually targetable like ours. The latter scheme is regarded as more sophisticated.

Since the United States is already in the production phase, it is hard to see how a mutual moratorium can be arranged. Coupling it with the Nixon visit to Romania, the Soviet leaders may feel that they have no choice but to press their MIRV equivalent, or as close to it as they can get, and so the nuclear arms race starts on another upward spiral. But Congress still has a chance

SUMMER SCHEDULE

During the summer, *The Nation* will not appear on the following dates: July 21, August 4, August 18.

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to make its voice heard. It can insist, as Mr. Moorhead suggests, on an immediate suspension of the GE production schedule pending U.S.-Soviet talks.

Whatever the outcome, this episode brings into sharp relief a basic weakness of our governmental system in the missile-space age. Vast governmental-corporate enterprises like the Department of Defense hold a tactical advantage over their Congressional overseers. They are in a position to act, to take the initiative, while the Congress, very few of whose members have enough technical background to know what is going on, is still debating. In the MIRV case the Pentagon simply took $88 million out of a lump sum of $1.72 billion which the Congress had authorized for "missile procurement-Air Force," and went into production. Who authorized a step of such monumental proportions? Did the President know about it? If so, did he think it would help to persuade the Soviets to agree to a moratorium? Suppose it has the opposite effect? In any case what becomes of the "democratic process" when momentous decisions are made in this fashion?

Kahn's Canals

Since all other measures have failed, the Department of Defense has turned to Herman Kahn's Hudson Institute to tell it how to win in Vietnam, or at least get out without complete loss of face. Combining patriotism and business acumen, Kahn accordingly wrote a scenario, the chief feature of which is a "new" type of "death-belt barrier" to be built around Saigon and along the Cambodian border. Although similar in principle to the ill-fated McNamara Line and its predecessor, the Maginot Line, the Kahn Line has several "gee-whiz" features not found in the earlier versions. It is a line of water, which would make construction contractors happy for years. Canals would be dug from the Gulf of Siam to a point on the Cambodian border opposite Saigon, thence connecting with a circumambient canal to protect the capital. The earth dredged from the canals would form a bank 50 yards high—that's as high as a 15-story building, if the *New York Times* description does not exaggerate. Two chain-link fences would make trespassing more perilous. The far bank of the canal would be fortified with barbed wire, mine fields and electric sensors.

But what about the Vietcong and North Vietnamese who are already in the villages? Dr. Kahn has not neglected them. The American forces, reduced to 100,000 or 200,000 men by the middle of 1971, would be pulled back to the coast and kept in readiness to reinforce the South Vietnamese troops in case the latter should succumb to combat fatigue or other disabling illness. American Special Forces would build up large units of Montagnard tribesmen who would harass the Vietcong unmercifully. The war, that is, would be Montagnardized, leaving the troops of the Republic of Vietnam to attend to more pleasant duties.

It all sounds so good that when officials of the Nixon Administration tell us that the wide-ranging package has "considerable appeal," but decline to say which features are "being woven into the fabric of our strategy," we are consumed with curiosity.

The editors regret to announce the death in New York of Grandin Conover, who, from November 30, 1964 to October 18, 1965, was literary editor of *The Nation*. Conover was a man of wit, imagination and creative energy; a sensitive editor and a delightful colleague. It is tragic that his life was so brief, and we express our deepest sympathy to his family and many friends.

The Right to Moonlight

Back in March, Henry P. Leifermann, then a reporter for UPI, wrote an article for *The Nation* about Memphis a year after Dr. Martin Luther King's assassination. Leifermann knew that it was customary for UPI reporters to "clear" manuscripts with executives before submitting them elsewhere. So he mentioned to UPI executives that he intended to do a piece about Memphis and was told that it would never be approved if it "said anything bad about the Memphis newspapers." In addition to having the usual agent-client relationship, both UPI and the Memphis papers are owned by Scripps-Howard. But Leifermann went ahead anyway and wrote the piece, without formal clearance, and *The Nation* published it (March 31). In the article he characterized the Memphis papers as part of the city's "establishment" and said they were "open to valid charges of discrimination in their news columns" because of racial labeling; he went on to accuse them of taking "an almost rabid stand behind whatever the police force proposes." For this horrendous offense he was given a five-day suspension without pay. Leifermann then resigned, saying UPI had no right to suspend him, and he is now in the Atlanta office of *Newsweek*.

Fortunately the Wire Service Guild, which represents the wire service newsmen, has decided to force the case to arbitration. The Guild contends, as does Leifermann, that in writing the article he was exercising his rights under the First Amendment, to which by their own account the newspapers and wire services are utterly and passionately devoted. "It is easy to see where this sort of conduct could lead this wire service and the news business in general," Leifermann comments. "In attempting to placate the wishes of clients, all semblance of honesty or fairness in its news reports will soon be lost."

No one doubts that the press is committed to the First Amendment; it is forever insisting, as it should, on its right to function without prepublication censorship of any kind. But freedom of the press involves more than freedom for newspapers; it protects the working press as well as the publishers and editors of newspapers. The Leifermann case is one of "first impression" so far as the wire services are concerned, and regardless of how it is finally decided, an important precedent is in the making.

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A Little Something for Everyone

PAUL WOHL
Mr. Wohl covers the Soviet scene and international communism for The Christian Science Monitor.

Moscow has had its way at the Communist summit. For the Russians the international conference of seventy-five Communist and workers' parties, which met in the Kremlin from June 5 to 17, was at once a liturgical exercise at home and a political maneuver against Peking.

For the Moscow-oriented movement outside the Soviet bloc it was a quickening experience. On the other hand, the Communist parties of Japan, North Korea, North Vietnam and most of southern Asia, which seek to remain aloof from both Moscow and Peking, are gratified that they did not participate in what turned out to be a focused attack on Maoism, earlier Soviet promises notwithstanding. Peking has called it a "sinister counterrevolutionary conference" and "a despicable plot."

Little more than half of the world's 45 million Communists were represented at the conference and nine-tenths of this half belonged to nine parties that rule in their own countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union), where communism is revolutionary only in a historical sense. The Cuban party, which still has a revolutionary spark, was represented by an observer.

Among the domesticated ruling parties, only the Romanians did not follow Moscow in all matters. This meant that innovations could come only from among the sixty-six nonruling parties, whose total membership is between 2.5 million and 3 million, more than 2 million of them in Western Europe.

Officially, each party had equal status at the conference. Membership did not matter, and the party of San Marino, Ireland, Lesotho, Réunion or Martinique was the peer of the Italian party with more than 1.5 million members or the French party with close to 400,000 members. The Italian party alone has six times as many members as all twenty-four Latin American parties.

Some of the parties present in the Kremlin—for example the Communist party of West Berlin or that of Namibie (South West Africa)—did not exist nine years ago when the previous Communist summit convened, with China present. While the importance of a party in the political life of its country is not necessarily measured by the number of its members, nor is a country significant entirely according to its area or inhabitants, this theoretical equality imposed a certain artificiality on the Moscow conference.

Nevertheless, the conference was a political event. It has made history, to use a term cherished by the Soviets. After this summit there can no longer be a dominant party. In relations among Communist parties (outside the Soviet bloc) the rule of diversity and plurality has been admitted. The myth of the monolith is abandoned.

Some speeches were severely critical of the Soviet party's methods, particularly of the occupation of Czechoslovakia and of Moscow's appraisal of the international situation. Other speeches, notably those of Italy's Ernesto Berlinguer, Australia's Laurie Aarons, Cuba's Carlos R. Rodriguez and the Dominican Republic's Manuel Sanchez, were an outright challenge to the organizers of the conference. Nevertheless, and in contrast to the previous international conferences of 1957 and 1960, the delegates' speeches were published by the Soviet press in full or in summary, many summaries being drafted by the delegations themselves. The example of the Russian press, moreover, seems to have been followed by all the leading Communist newspapers of the bloc. For the first time since Lenin's day, *Pravda* readers had evidence that their allegedly all-knowing, always "correct" party was being taken to task by foreign Communists.

Seven delegations (Australia, Austria, Britain, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, with a combined membership of more than 1.6 million) openly condemned the Warsaw pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. Others, like the Romanians, disapproved implicitly. The French party, which initially expressed "surprise and disapproval," took an ambivalent stand. Its secretary general, Waldeck Rochet, made no reference in his address to Czechoslovakia. He paid tribute to the "sovereignty of each party," but on the other hand came out for "proletarian internationalism," which is the principle the Soviets invoked to justify the invasion.

A few days later, the French delegation held a press conference for the benefit of members back home. Politburo member Georges Marchais recalled that the French party had "disapproved military intervention in Czechoslovakia," but also referred to the desire of the Czechoslovak party that "the problem should not be discussed at the international conference." The reason for this ambiguous performance may well be that the French Communists have once again become financially dependent on the "solidarity" of the Soviet party. The same may be true of other parties that avoided a clear statement on the Czechoslovak issue. The Spaniards, on the other hand, showed themselves indomitable, although presumably also dependent on Soviet support.

China was the cause of the other major controversy. The long-winded conference document with the formidable title "On the tasks of the struggle at the present time against imperialism and the unity of action of Communist parties and anti-imperialist forces" included China among the world's "Socialist countries" and refrained from criticizing Peking.

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At the preparatory meetings it had been agreed that no party would be attacked by name at the conference. The last meeting of the preparatory commission in May, with more than sixty parties represented, once again confirmed this rule. However, this session coincided with renewed gunfire on the Sino-Soviet border, and as at the preceding meeting in March, Secretary General Leonid I. Brezhnev cited the shooting as a reason why the commission would change its ruling. Those who opposed a condemnation of China stood firm. (The coincidence between the meetings of the preparatory commission and the outbreaks on the Sino-Soviet border was interesting.)

Ten days later, in his address to the conference, Mr. Brezhnev ignored the agreement and subjected China to a blistering attack—its "feverish war preparations," its preparations for a "a great nuclear war . . . against the Soviet 'revisionists,'" its "intention of planting the banner of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung on the entire planet," its party-splitting activities in almost thirty countries," its "direct or indirect support of imperialism." Hardly any insult in the rich Communist vocabulary was omitted.

Backes, Nuernberger Nachrichten

Scores of smaller parties then followed the Soviet lead. Among speakers for parties representing Communist states, only Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu came out for continued good relations with all parties, including China. Italy's Ernesto Berlinguer offered to mediate between the Chinese and the Russians. There could be no peaceful coexistence, he said, without Chinese cooperation. A perpetuation of the hostility raised the danger of a world order based on bilateral agreement between Washington and Moscow.

Criticism of the Soviet party was not limited to the two big issues. "Marxist thinking in the last decades has to a large extent become schematic and dogmatic," said Mr. Berlinguer. "We consider negative the tendency to stick a label of ideological condemnation on anyone who holds a different opinion." It would be dangerous for a Russian to express such views.

Another point of discord between the Soviet party and its critics was the feasibility of a single model of socialism. Each party must go its own way, was the line of the dissenters. Differences also arose over Soviet insistence on peaceful coexistence. That had been the burden of Mr. Brezhnev's speech. Peaceful coexistence, he said, not only means no war; it also implies growing cultural, scientific and trade relations between Socialist and capitalist countries. But according to Cuba's Carlos Rodriguez, the main goal of Communists should not be the preservation of peace but the annihilation of imperialism. "This is a more general and greater task than the maintenance of peace." The same view was expressed in even stronger terms by the delegate from the Dominican Republic.

Most of these opposition statements were carried by *Pravda*. They were somewhat toned down for publication, but those who wanted to know exactly what the foreign delegates had said usually could obtain the full texts in Russian translation. How many Russians dared avail themselves of this facility is another matter.

This frankness was a big shift from traditional Soviet behavior, but the risk may not have been as great as it seems. Dissenters in the USSR listen to Western broadcasts and know what is being said. The great mass of *Pravda* readers, on the other hand, no longer pay much attention to international party politics and ideology. Some of the criticism leveled at the home party, moreover, cannot have pleased the average Russian, who prefers peace to war and no longer believes in world revolution. As far as China goes, Mr. Brezhnev probably also had the great majority of his people on his side. Nevertheless, the open airing of controversy was the price the Kremlin had to pay in order to get a large number of parties to the conference.

Why, then, were the Soviets so keen on this conference? After the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, there was no longer a machinery for this kind of international meeting; the last Comintern congress met in 1935. And in the years after World War II, there was no need for a Communist summit. Stalin was the supreme mystagogue, the "father of the peoples"; his authority was unconditionally accepted by all parties. Only the Yugoslavs dared skepticism.

Things changed after Stalin's death. The "confusion and disarray" of which Stalin's heirs warned at his bier did not break out immediately, but the authority of the Russian party was no longer beyond question. Questioning voices began to be heard in the Soviet Union and internationally. The legitimacy of party and state was challenged.

The two institutions which are supposed to perpetuate the revolution and from which the party claims to have received its mandate are the local soviets and the international Communist movement. Incessant efforts to activate the local soviets have not been successful. The grassroots democracy which they were to represent has again and again been smothered by the bureaucracy.

That leaves the international movement as the heir to the revolution and the mainspring of the authority of the Soviet party and the Russian state. The Kremlin's interest

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in international communism also has a practical angle. Most foreign parties have acted, openly or unwittingly, as auxiliaries of Soviet foreign policy. They were, to say the least, good-will agents for the USSR. The dogma of the last Comintern congress had been that it was the first duty of every Communist everywhere to defend the Soviet Union. After the war, this was no longer official doctrine but it lingered on in the thinking of most Communists.

Even after the 20th congress of the Soviet party in 1957 had conceded that each party might chart its own road to socialism and had reaffirmed the Leninist principle that all parties are equal, the Kremlin retained a unique international authority. In November 1957, on the occasion of the first international Communist summit in honor of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, it was Chairman Mao who proclaimed this leading role for the Soviet party.

In 1960, when the second summit convened, the Soviets still headed the international movement, but behind the façade the rift with China was deepening. By 1964 Nikita S. Khrushchev was drumming up support among the Western and overseas parties for another summit at which Peking would be read out of the Communist movement. The going was difficult, there were objections from many sides, and before long Khrushchev himself was out.

The reconciliation with Peking, which his successors initially sought did not occur, and today the two Communist giants are on the brink of war. Russia's need for the backing of international communism has never been more evident. The impassioned denunciation of Maoism at the conference just adjourned gave the Kremlin a propaganda plank against Peking which it previously lacked. The fact that the conference document does not actually mention China is of secondary importance.

There are indications that some Soviet leaders believe the opposition to Mao's rule inside China is approaching a climax. According to *Correspondenza Socialista* in Rome, anti-Mao Chinese in Moscow have formed a Communist party in exile, headed by Wang Ming, the predecessor of Mao Tse-tung. Such an organization could have been set up only with the Kremlin's consent.

Therefore, the hawks in Moscow may well have decided that the occasion calls for a "pre-emptive" strike against China's nuclear installations and MIG factories, all in easy air distance of the Soviet or Mongolian border. Russian spokesmen at the United Nations, in Washington and the West European capitals have questioned governments and the media as to their probable reaction if the Chinese escalated a conflict in the Far East to the level of nuclear war.

The question is spurious because, compared with those of the USSR, China's nuclear weapons are minimal. Recent Chinese notes to Moscow show that Peking has become seriously disturbed by the prospect of a Soviet first strike and is taking a more conciliatory attitude. Moscow's hawks may not have it their way, for there is evidence that the leadership is divided.

On April 2, Tass published an advance summary of the issue of *Kommunist,* the central committee's leading bimonthly, that was due in the first half of the month. According to this report, the magazine would accuse Peking of striking the Soviet Union in the back and of having opened a "second front." That issue of *Kommunist* was finally released to the printer on April 21, without the sentences quoted by Tass. Such delays and changes of text are usually signs of conflict at the top. In this case the doves seem to have gained the upper hand.

Meanwhile, new reports have come in of Soviet concentrations of rockets, planes and armor in the Far East, in Mongolia and on the border of Sinkiang, where the Soviet radio is wooing the non-Chinese Muslim tribes. No one can foretell the outcome. The only thing certain is that the anti-Mao speeches at the recent summit have strengthened Moscow's hand and could provide the political orchestration for a Soviet intervention in China—which, naturally, would be presented as both defensive and designed to free the Chinese masses of the "Mao clique." Moscow broadcasts have hinted recently that it is a Communist duty to help the Chinese to oust Mao.

The permanent record of the conference is its basic document: it was signed by sixty-nine parties. Two parties (Cuba and Sweden) did not sign because they attended as observers; two other parties (Britain and Norway) must consult their central committees before signing; one party (Dominican Republic) refused to sign because the document was not sufficiently revolutionary.

With seventy-five parties represented, the number of signatures should have been seventy, but sixty-nine is the official figure.

Four of these (Italy, San Marino, Australia and Réunion) signed only the third chapter of the document, the one on struggle against imperialism. Five parties signed with reservations.

Much of the conference document is an exercise in what Italian party chief Luigi Longo has called *trionfalismo* (triumphalism). Socialism in the past ten years is said to have advanced everywhere, "confirming the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. . . . The victory of the revolutionary and progressive forces is inevitable." The Socialist system, it is stated repeatedly, has triumphed in fourteen countries, six of which did not take part in the conference (Albania, China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Yugoslavia; and Cuba was represented only by an observer). That is a far cry from Lenin's prediction at the 8th party congress in 1919: "We shall see the international [meaning world-wide] Soviet republic."

The document refers to contradictions inside imperialism, but not to contradictions inside the Socialist system. In line with customary Communist shibboleths, the United States is descibed as "the exploiter and policeman of the world, the merciless enemy of liberation movements," which, among other things, has "completed the factual occupation of the Indian Ocean," an area in which the Soviets have lately shown lively interest. Moscow's old bogy man West Germany is dealt with more mildly than in

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the past, perhaps with a thought to current Soviet efforts to develop better relations with Bonn. In all main points the world outlook of the conference document jibes with trends discernible in Soviet foreign policy.

A new note is the emphasis on the cohesion of the imperialist system, internal contradictions notwithstanding, and imperialism's ability to plan in advance and to coordinate its economy. This is something that Marxist-Leninists have hitherto categorically denied. It moves the Moscow prognosticators to stress the need for peaceful coexistence. The defense of peace and the economic strengthening of the Soviet Union and the other Socialist states are described as the principal tasks of all Communist and progressive forces in the present stage.

The basic conservatism of the parties that hold power, and even of some of the large West European parties that have reached understanding with their establishments, is reflected in this line. It is offset by a few revolutionary safeguards. Peaceful coexistence, says the document, does not signify the maintenance of the social and political *status quo* or the weakening of the ideological struggle, nor does it deny the "inalienable right" of peoples to defend themselves against imperialist aggressors. In an ostensible world survey of just causes in which people now fight against aggression or imperialist encroachment, the document mentions only those that are supported by the USSR. The case of Biafra, understandably, is omitted.

This incomplete, biased and rather superficial analysis of the world situation was criticized at the conference, and accounts for the reservations of several delegations and for the fact that some parties signed only the one chapter.

The admission that Communist parties may hold different opinions and that each party has the right to chart its own course is the most important feature of the document. It can be said that the recognition of the principles of plurality and diversity inside communism, which emerged from the debate, was what the reform movement in Czechoslovakia was about. But thus far these principles are not admitted internally by the ruling parties, and Moscow's dialectical proficiency has worded the conference document so ambiguously that another Czechoslovakia in the name of proletarian internationalism is not altogether excluded.

Thus all participants—as so often happens at international councils of whatever political persuasion—went home with something. The Soviets got a proclamation of Communist unity and of loyalty to Moscow, complete with scores of denunciations of Peking, from a sizable part of the Communist movement. The Italians and other dissidents won recognition of the principles of plurality and diversity. The former colonial peoples obtained a cautious endorsement of their "just causes" and the right publicly to add reservations to the document.

Only such uncompromising revolutionaries as the Communists of the Dominican Republic protested against the document and implicitly joined the other half of the revolutionary movement which either gravitates toward Peking or takes an independent stand.

Probably the only participants to be fully satisfied with the conference, and with the repetitious, double-bottomed document to which it gave birth, are the Kremlin's master dialecticians and the faithful party stalwarts who once again had an opportunity to intone communism's traditional liturgy.

THE GLENVILLE SHOOT-OUT

BAD DAY IN CLEVELAND

ROLDO BARTIMOLE

Mr. Bartimole, formerly a reporter in the Cleveland office of The Wall Street Journal, *now writes a biweekly newsletter,* Point of View, *dealing with politics and social developments in that city.*

Cleveland

Sometimes in history it has become politically convenient to sacrifice the socially despised for the "protection" of society. Rationalizations of justice then overpower the judicial process and make it merely the means of legitimizing society's need for a victim. However, such political trials often become, as in the cases of Sacco and Vanzetti and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, not the end of the matter but only the beginning.

A beginning of that sort may have been the conviction of Fred "Ahmed" Evans, a black nationalist, who has been sentenced to die in the electric chair in September for the murders of three policemen and a civilian in a gun fight between police and black nationalists last July 23 in the Glenville section of Cleveland. A shooting fray of this sort provides some of the classic demands for a political trial: a case involving the seemingly open defiance of established order by a "deviant" who is the product of the very social ills the society seems unable to correct; the eruption of violent conflict at a time when the process of justice is compliant to the political climate of "law and order"; and a need to destroy the legitimacy of any leadership among the socially despised. The prosecution may have summed it up by asking for conviction in the name of "preserving the American way of life." It was crucial, too, that the event took place in a city that had elected a black mayor, thus providing both a possible step toward the problem-solving but also a test of the depth of racism. Mayor Carl B. Stokes had steered the community peacefully through the difficult period after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Indeed,

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at the time of the shooting the Mayor was enjoying his height of popularity. Yet there were strains, especially between the administration and a police department which rejected a black leader. The Glenville episode started on a day when the Mayor was out of town and the police were warning of impending violence and plots to assassinate black leaders, including the Mayor. The police have been and remain eager to raid black nationalists' headquarters and constantly keep alive the concept of themselves as the "thin blue line" between whites they protect and blacks they patrol.

Glenville lies in the northeast corner of Cleveland, not far from the city line of East Cleveland, an older suburban area. The section has short, narrow streets with two- and three-story buildings, mostly housing, with alleys running between and behind the structures. The confusion and conflicting stories of how and what happened to set off the violence have never been satisfactorily outlined. The first alleged sign of activity was a police report that fifteen to twenty armed men, some of whom had arrived shortly before by car, were leaving Evans' apartment. This apartment became one of three main locations where militants and police traded gunfire on the streets serving a compact two-block area about the size of two football fields. At the farthest point from Ahmed's apartment, a police tow truck came under fire; the third location was between these two points, where two militants were killed behind a house that allegedly contained snipers.

Although police listed their casualties as victims of snipers, the initial firing suggests a spreading gun battle at street level. The eruption brought hundreds of policemen into the area where a police "surveillance team" of undetermined number had been watching Evans' apartment after reports that the militants had armed themselves. The heaviest shooting and casualties came near Evans' apartment in the first hour and a half. Shooting at alleged snipers continued late into the night, but the three nationalists killed and the one wounded were all shot at street level. There have been unsubstantiated rumors, however, that the bodies of dead and wounded nationalists were spirited away.

Evans was charged and convicted on seven counts of murder. Four of these counts arise from an Ohio conspiracy law that states: "Whoever aids, abets, or procures another to commit an offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender." An all-white jury deliberated sixteen hours to convict Evans on all counts; it made no recommendations of mercy. Four other nationalists face the same charges and will stand trial this summer.

This tragic event, which took the lives of seven persons and left many wounded, including eleven officers, could have been viewed as a spontaneous eruption of violence or even a police attempt to eradicate black nationalists; but it has been viewed by officials, press, academics and certainly by the prosecution and police as a conspiracy to kill police.

A Cleveland *Plain Dealer* headline two days after the outbreak told its readers it was a "massacre of police," a description generally accepted in the community. The necessity of punishment for a "massacre" is self-evident; but the conspiracy charge is flimsy and the possibility of police provocation raises the question whether self-defense, even against police, is not legally permissible.

Ahmed Evans was both a likely and unlikely protagonist. Two years ago, he predicted that blood would flow in the streets of this city in a race war coinciding with an eclipse of the sun. The day passed without event, other than a police raid of Evans' astrology shop. His warnings of doom, however, were given nation-wide publicity through an article in *The Wall Street Journal* that was picked up by the press across the country. The notoriety changed Evans' image from that of an eccentric astrologist to a leading black nationalist. He also bitterly complained that it made him a target of police harassments and beatings.

Ironically, Evans helped to create the appearance of racial harmony that Mayor Stokes was nurturing. Evans walked the streets to preserve the peace after Dr. King's death, as he had joined with the civil rights leader in 1967. During that summer, Evans and other militants were paid from a private businessmen's fund to "keep it cool for Carl." The calm, many felt, helped Stokes win City Hall. Even at the time of the shooting, Evans was receiving funds from a City Hall program. But Ahmed's peace-keeping activities never made as good copy as his warnings. Defense lawyer Stanley Tolliver blamed the news media for creating the image of Evans as a "black Frankenstein."

"Who shot first? And at whom? Various accounts of where, how and why the shooting started have appeared. Even after extensive investigation, the questions remain unanswered," concludes the study of the Glenville shootout by the Civil Violence Research Center of Case-Western Reserve University for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. Police contend the nationalists fired upon them first; the nationalists contend the opposite. Evans gave this version:

> I was heading for the Lakeview Tavern [*a short distance from his apartment*] when I heard shots coming from the end of the street. Then one of the brothers passed me. Some policemen in a blue detective's car opened up with a machine gun and he was dead. So I ran into a yard and I began trading shots with a policeman behind a parked car. I couldn't hit him. I wasn't even coming anywhere close to him. And then my carbine jammed.

Joseph Turpin, a country workhouse guard who lives near Evans, testified at the trial that Evans attempted to enter his home about 8 P.M. that night. Turpin said he didn't allow him in but that he made five phone calls between 8:15 and 11:30 P.M. to the police for Evans, who had told Turpin he wanted to surrender. A Legal Aid lawyer testified that a prosecution witness said one of the prosecution lawyers had told this witness that he was aware Ahmed was in Turpin's attic at the time the

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policemen were killed. (No spent shells were found in the attic by a police search.)

Two witnesses were key to the conspiracy theory of the police and prosecution. One was Sgt. John J. Ungvary, for some thirty years a member and head of the Cleveland Police Department's Subversives Squad—a department that has a reputation for conspiracy theories, especially those involving Communists. (In 1966 the Cuyahoga County grand jury with the help of police blamed the Hough riots on subversives and Communists, though even the Federal Bureau of Investigation dismissed the contention.)

Sergeant Ungvary testified that he had discussed "revolution" with Evans and that the black nationalist had told him it was "inevitable." Evans said, according to Ungvary, "sooner or later there's going to be open warfare between whites and blacks and the beasts will be eliminated." (It was Ungvary who brought information of impending trouble to City Hall the afternoon of July 23. An informant had told him that Evans had been to Detroit and Pittsburgh the previous night for arms and was planning another arms-running trip that night as a prelude to an early morning attack. This was never verified and the informant, according to the Civil Violence report, was suspected of being under the influence of drugs.)

Ungvary's thinking, typical of the police mentality in Cleveland, can best be illustrated by his testimony two years ago before Mississippi Sen. James O. Eastland's Internal Security subcommittee. Ungvary told the Senators: "What we need is a law that would let us charge them all [black nationalists] as conspirators. . . . Wouldn't that be far better than to wait for an overt act?" That concept, blacks believe, was put to use in Glenville.

The second prosecution witness to lend credence to the conspiracy theory was 17-year-old Walter Lee Washington, Jr., who described himself as a member of the Black Panther Party, which he said was a "social club."

Washington testified that a meeting was held at Evans' apartment on the morning of July 23 to discuss a shoot-out with police and that Evans showed those present "how to load and unload a rifle and what to do if it jammed." Here is part of the testimony in answer to prosecution questions:

Q. What was the purpose of the meeting?

A. To tell us when the pop is going to jump off.

Q. What do you mean?

A. When there was to be a revolution.

Washington was an unusual witness for the state. He had been charged on January 23 with first-degree murder in the street-stabbing death of a 68-year-old man. The man was stabbed eleven times in the back. The murder took place in September, after Washington and four companions, according to police, had set fire to a church, a fish market and an abandoned building, all in one night. Police described the gang at that time as terrorizers of residents and merchants in the Glenville area. In addition to murder, Washington had charges of arson, glue-sniffing and theft lodged against him. All those charges have been dropped and today Washington is a soldier in the U.S. Army, an alternative he was offered to standing trial for arson. Though defense lawyers broadly hinted that the prosecution had bought perjured testimony from Washington, the jury apparently believed the conspiracy theory advanced by Ungvary and Washington.

Cleveland Plain Dealer

Fred Evans

Only one person named Evans directly as having fired a bullet, and his testimony was strongly contested. William H. McMillan, a police tow-truck driver, testified Evans was the man who had shot him. However, the registered nurse who treated McMillan and a hospital aide testified that McMillan couldn't identify anyone at the hospital that night, though he was asked several times. "He didn't know what happened or who shot him," the nurse said. Further, she testified that McMillan was more interested in calling reporters about the shooting than in receiving treatment for his wounds.

In talks with reporters, McMillan proposed the theory that the abandoned auto which the tow truck was to pick up was a "decoy," intended to lure the truck into an ambush and subsequently the police too, when they responded to McMillan's call for help. The theory fell by the wayside; it lacked plausibility because pickups of abandoned cars are most unreliable and usually occur two or three days after the initial request. The Civil Violence

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report dismissed the theory, saying the tow truck "arrived at the wrong place at the wrong time." But the ambush theory lived on in popular imagination.

Mayor Stokes from the beginning blamed a "small, organized gang" for the violence and said it would "meet the full measure of the law." He tried to play down the gun battle, calling it an "incident," as an isolated act of violence. Though the Mayor called down the full measure of the law on the militants, he failed to pursue a number of promised investigations into police activities, including one complaint in which a black private guard was killed. In this case, the city law director arrived and was told by citizens that the shots came from a police car.

The Civil Violence report, release of which was delayed until after the Evans trial on the ground that it might interfere with the trial, echoes the Mayor and the conventional version of the gun battle as a violent act of blacks. The report says: "A small, well-equipped army of black extremists was responsible for the bloodshed (whether or not they fired the first shot)." The sweeping sentence was quickly picked up by the media as the reasoned conclusion of the report and further evidence that the militants were to blame. Though a reading of the report suggests its writers misread their own facts, the headlines of Cleveland papers indicate the effect: "Masotti [Louis H. Masotti, a political scientist at Case-Western Reserve who headed the report staff] Report Hits Fanatics," said the Cleveland *Press*; "Masotti Blames Glenville Battle on 'Extremists,'" said the *Plain Dealer*. Masotti told me that he was "sick" that the sentence had remained in the final version of the report, that it was supposed to have been deleted. (The sentence, however, reveals a bias of the report; it concerns itself with escalating black violence without giving equal attention to the possibilities of escalation on the part of the police.)

It was decided at the afternoon police meeting to deploy a "mobile" and "inconspicuous" surveillance of Evans' apartment. The Civil Violence report says "enough cars were available for an effective moving surveillance and the police department would assign to the task as many Negro officers as it could." But the police in the field established a stationary surveillance, with cars full of white policemen parked within easy sight of the apartment. The police disregard of orders was "glaringly evident," said the Civil Violence report, but it never pursued the question of how it happened. The nationalists believed that the police were preparing to spring an attack. "We were ambushed, not the police," Evans said later. (Shortly before the shooting, Evans, armed and disturbed, met with two black city officials and asked them to "get the surveillance removed." The meeting ended when he told them, "Tell the Big Brother downtown that everything is going to be all right." The officials felt it would be futile to ask the officers in the lookout cars to move. They drove away to a telephone and by the time they called City Hall, the shooting had started.)

At this point two other factors, the time when the shooting started and the use by police of two radio frequencies, combined with the disregard of orders, suggest that the official version of what happened in Glenville purposely hides the truth. Masotti admits that there was conflicting evidence on the time factor, and that he was aware the police used two frequencies. The surveillance team was from the tactical unit, which communicates with its headquarters on a high frequency that is not heard by regular patrol cars.

The starting time for the violence was put at 8:25 P.M. by the police and so accepted by the Mayor (who issued an "official" time chronology) and the Civil Violence report. However, one time fact conflicts sharply. Patrolman Louis Golonka was pronounced dead at Forest City Hospital at 8:40 P.M. The official chronology has him shot at 8:35 P.M., which means he had to hear the "all units" call for help at 8:30 P.M., get to the scene, be shot, rescued and taken to the hospital to be pronounced dead—all in ten minutes.

Why would the police distort the time when the conflict started? Some speculate that the tactical unit had made contact with the militants, possibly initiated it, but had not alerted the regular patrol police. As the gun battle spread, the police tow truck became involved, was hit and radioed for help on a low frequency band, bringing regular patrols into the area. The fact that four policemen were shot within a one-minute time span and four others in another one-minute period indicates that they were unprepared for what they encountered.

For certain, militants were armed, engaged in a gun battle with police and probably killed some officers. (The defense suggested that some officers were killed by other policemen. Defense lawyers showed that two of the three officers killed were drunk.) But the argument that black militants planned an ambush and conspired to kill policemen is not convincing. The prosecution showed that Evans and his associates had bought thirteen weapons, including high-powered rifles. But the weapons were bought openly in Cleveland area department and discount stores, and Evans even signed a police document, necessary for the purchase of weapons in one suburb. (Witnesses testified that Evans had formed a gun club and a neighborhood barber testified that in July he had found a practice range for the group's use.)

The defense attacked several decisions of the Cuyahoga County coroner's office which dovetailed with the police version of the shooting. For example, the original autopsy of Lt. LeRoy Jones indicated he was killed by a "shotgun"-caused wound, but that was later changed to read a "gunshot" wound, coinciding with the police claims that militants had semi-automatic weapons while the police had only hand guns and shotguns.

More revealing was the coroner's ruling that James Chapman, a 22-year-old Negro whom police described as a "hero" who helped to rescue police, was killed by a long-range shot, thus by a sniper. Dr. Cyril H. Wecht, an eminent Pittsburgh pathologist, testified categorically

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that Chapman was killed by a shot fired not more than "six inches" from his head. Contrary to normal procedures, laboratory reports showing that police were drunk were not included in their autopsies.

The political nature of the trial extended beyond being merely an attack upon black nationalism. Charles R. Laurie, the assistant prosecutor, made broad insinuations about Mayor Stokes's involvement. "Why did City Hall let the police go in there unprepared? Why? What were they going to fight back with? Spitballs?" At another point Laurie said: "Under the façade of making dolls and *dashikis* [the program funded by the city with Evans as its head] in the shop [well outside the area of conflict], they prepared for war against the men in blue. City Hall gave him the money and what did he do in gratitude? He gave them hot bullets in return."

Although common pleas court Judge George J. McMonagle, who heard the case, overruled the defense plea for a new trial because of racism, saying that there "is no basis for such contentions," most would sharply disagree. The prosecution lawyers, both white, several times during the summation, called the two Negro defense lawyers "boys." Laurie badgered one young Negro girl, finally screaming, "You hate white people, don't you?" He then asked her, "Wasn't my color the people that put up the money for these [poverty] programs?"

Of Chapman, Laurie said: "He was a decent citizen and he wasn't even a white citizen. . . ." And in the final plea, he told the jury that they had to take a stand as Americans and warned: "From an acorn grows a mighty tree. A spoonful of ink in a gallon of water gives you a tainted color."

There have been other casualties of the trial. The verdict brought campus disorders to Case-Western Reserve University, where students protested the delay of the Civil Violence report, feeling its release would have aided Evans. The Civil Violence Center at the university is now the subject of a campus investigation and Masotti, in the midst of the disorders, resigned as its head.

Twenty persons have been convicted of contempt of court and given up to one year in jail for disorders stemming from an attempt to bring charges against the police for their actions in Glenville. Prosecutor John T. Corrigan refused to meet with them. They were arrested for blocking the doors of criminal court on the third day that they sought an audience with him. Judge McMonagle, who imposed the stiff sentences, said the group, called the July 23rd Defense Committee, made a "planned assault . . . to physically shut down the courthouse. . . ." He said the harsh punishment was to prevent further disrespect for the law. Since testimony before him in the Evans case told of beating and probably murder by police, the judge's

(Continued on page 61)

MR. NIXON'S URBAN BALLET

HAMILTON E. DAVIS
Mr. Davis is Washington bureau chief of The Providence Journal. *Earlier, he headed an urban affairs team for the newspapers of Providence.*

Washington

When President Nixon took office, one of his firmest resolutions was to avoid the rhetorical excesses of the Johnson administration, the soaring and pretentious language, the inflated claims, and the orchestrated publicity that led to expectations for programs which, in reality, simply could not be met. To a considerable extent, Mr. Nixon has been successful in this effort.

Yet he faces the problem in a different, and perhaps more serious form. The Nixon Administration has taken office at a time when the need for initiatives in the area of domestic, and especially urban, problems is acute. At the same time, it must cut the budget in order to combat inflation, and it must continue to finance the war in Vietnam. The upshot is that until the war is liquidated, there is no new money for domestic programs; most of them, in fact, will suffer cuts.

What the Administration has begun to do, in response to this obvious dilemma, is substitute choreography for action which, in the long run, is simply another aspect of the Johnson style. While this tendency is not yet widespread, it has been evidenced to date particularly in those programs dealing with the poor—the Model Cities program, and the much ballyhooed effort to funnel money into twenty cities that have suffered riot damage in the past few years. The latter instance was choreography in the grand manner.

Early this year, President Nixon visited the 7th Street corridor in northwest Washington, site of a major riot in April 1968. The President said he was shocked by the sight of rubble-strewn lots and boarded-up buildings. Obviously, little had been done to clean up the area and begin the job of rebuilding. So he ordered a quick study by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to see how widespread the problem was, and what could be done about it.

On April 8, the White House announced that a major statement would be forthcoming that afternoon on the urban situation. When reporters arrived in the West Wing, they were given a statement by the President, another by George Romney, Secretary of HUD, and a fistful of pictures of riot-damaged sections of several large cities, including Newark, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh and Detroit.

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There to meet them and to explain what was to be done was a group of Administration officials, led by Daniel P. Moynihan, the President's assistant for urban affairs. He was accompanied by Richard Van Dusen, an under secretary at HUD, and Lawrence M. Cox, an assistant secretary at HUD.

The gist of the program to be announced was stated clearly and concisely in the printed statement by Mr. Nixon. First, he said, the Administration would find $9 million in the petty cash account to clean up the actual rubble that remained from the riots. In addition, he continued, roughly $200 million worth of HUD projects had already been approved, or were pending and likely to be approved, for the twenty cities named. "HUD will offer assistance to those cities in accelerating the delivery time of those programs which relate to riot-troubled neighborhoods," he said.

In other words, the Administration would provide $9 million that had not been available before, and it would urge HUD to shuffle the papers more rapidly on $200 million already in the pipe line. If that seems of less than cosmic importance, it is; and that is the point. Neither Mr. Nixon's Administration, nor any other, is going to make a big splash with an announcement that involves a paltry $9 million and some bureaucratic good will about something already available.

To create the impression of initiative and commitment, therefore, it was necessary that the Administration appear to be pouring $200 million of additional money—money that was not available until all this initiative was brought to bear—into the selected cities.

Enter Mr. Moynihan, as follows: "The first fact of this statement is the announcement of a $200 million and more program for the reconstruction of areas of American cities which have been damaged in civil disorders in the past year. . . ." There then ensued an extended, if diffused, effort by the reporters to find out the nature of this $200 million pledge, and a dazzling performance by Mr. Moynihan in confusing the issue, thereby leading at least some of his hearers to accept his first statement at face value.

The first question was directed at a HUD official. "Mr. Van Dusen, tell us about the $200 million program," the reporter asked. "Is this a new $200 million, or is it old money; is it deferred? What does it mean?"

Mr. Van Dusen answered this question twice with a description similar to that of Mr. Nixon, making it clear the money had been available all along and implying that it was *not* new. So after a few moments, Mr. Moynihan stepped in.

"This money is more than the $200 million involved," he said in part. "We have used a low figure because we haven't wanted to say things that in the end maybe we won't deliver. But this is in the greatest measure new money. That which has been approved in the last couple of months has been approved in the President's directive to find out what is going on here and there.

"This is new money," he continued earnestly. "It is designed to do something that very clearly the government has—those powers that exist have not been able to do so in the time that has so far elapsed."



Los Angeles Times

The Medium Is the Massage

The discussion continued, but the reporters kept circling back to the $200 million, which they all knew had to go into the first paragraph of their stories. Thus:

Q. President Nixon says, "I have made funds available to do so." How much funds has he made available?

Moynihan: The President has directed that for this enterprise the figure we were using of $200 million be made available.

Q. If I understood Mr. Van Dusen, this is the money that is already. . .

Moynihan: Appropriated.

Q. . . . already appropriated and earmarked for these various programs.

Moynihan: We have been earmarking it for the past two months as we have assembled this program and there is about another 40 per cent yet to be [*turning to Van Dusen*] 40 per cent to go, or what?

Van Dusen: It is difficult to speak in precise percentages.

Moynihan: We are a little soft in the edges and the edges go to well beyond $200 million. This is new money that will be expended in these areas for the purpose of this program.

Q. Is this program for fiscal 1969?

Moynihan (*trying to shake off his pursuers*): Yes. But maybe we haven't made ourselves clear about the process we find going on. In the normal processes of what is getting funded and what is getting spent, nothing has been happening in these areas and the normal pressures of administration have been to put the money where you can spend it and because of these areas, somehow or other, whatever it takes to get money finally working, get re-

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construction, rehabilitation working, here hasn't happened. So the normal pressure of government will take it where it will.

Q. So what we are saying in effect is that this is a plan to expedite the process?

Moynihan: No. What we found was that in the normal process of administration, these parts of American cities where you might expect to have the highest priority for action were getting no action. Nothing was happening.

There was, in fact, a germ of intelligence in this flood of rhetoric. Mr. Moynihan was making the point that many city officials have a tendency to put their program money into areas that produce the quickest and most viable results, rather than into those that need it the most. The Administration, he indicated, would nudge cities into allocating their money to the hard-core slums, which is mostly where the riots took place.

There is nothing wrong with that. Even though there is little likelihood that such an effort will work (the projects involved were already approved, or very nearly so), the Administration has every right to try. But it is a minor flex of the bureaucratic muscle, not an infusion of new money, and certainly not worth a White House press extravaganza. It was, more than anything else, footwork. Choreography.

A few weeks later, Mr. Romney called a press conference to announce major new initiatives to correct the "critical deficiencies" in the Model Cities program as it was administered under Mr. Johnson. He said that the overall responsibility for the program would be vested for the first time in the Urban Affairs Council at the White House; that state governments would be brought into the planning process, although without a veto; that mayors would have responsibility at the local level; and that the restriction of a given project to 10 per cent of a city's population would be eliminated.

While it was clear that these were initiatives, it was equally clear that they left almost untouched the "critical" problems faced by the Johnson administration.

The purpose of the Model Cities program was to take a wide range of federal, state and local programs—anti-poverty programs, urban renewal, job training, educational assistance, welfare and so forth—and pull them together into a concentrated attack on all the problems of a small urban slum area.

This, it was hoped, would lead to a breakthrough that would point the way to solving the broader urban malaise. In the bureaucratic argot, it was to be post holing (a concentrated effort on a few people) rather than leaf raking (a scattered effort that hits a lot of people, but doesn't do much for any of them).

There were two fundamental difficulties with the program when the Nixon Administration took office. The first was the perennial shortage of money. The Johnson budget for fiscal 1970 called for an expenditure of $750 million for 150 cities, which is nearly $300 million less than what the Johnson planners had figured for the programs. The Model Cities money is only a supplement to the money available for the programs that come under its umbrella, but even so the Johnson budget was low.

The second problem went to the heart of the Model Cities concept; the need to coordinate the various programs so as to achieve maximum impact. Somebody who lives in a slum is likely, at any given time, to be in poor health, have a bad job or no job at all, live in a miserable house, be poorly educated, and so on. But the agencies that administer programs designed to alleviate these conditions tended to end up fighting one another rather than cooperating. The Office of Economic Opportunity was running job training, education and welfare programs; the Labor Department also ran job programs; the Department of Health, Education and Welfare ran its programs; and all of these often involved the same poor "clients" in the model neighborhoods.

Not surprisingly, each department thought it knew best how to run its type of program. Moreover, each department wanted to spend its available money according to its own philosophy and priorities.

This was even more true at the state and local levels; the result in many cases has been that the Model Cities legislation turned out to be not a newly forged instrument for urban rehabilitation but a smörgasbord.

The first thing the Nixon Administration did was to cut the Johnson administration budget request by $75 million. While this might have been justified by the state of the economy, it obviously did not enhance the program's chances for success. Moreover, Mr. Romney's decision to raise the size restriction can only dilute it further.

In his press conference, Mr. Romney said he did not mean that every city should rush out and draw model city plans for huge areas. He cited the example of Portland, Me., which needed only a slight increase in the size of its model neighborhood to include all of the city's major slum. However, that still leaves 149 other cities with full freedom to scatter their money and efforts to the extent the local mayor desires; if the rationale behind the Model Cities legislation was valid at all, this dilution can only further reduce the chances of success.

On the second, and even more critical deficiency—the lack of cooperation on the part of various public and private agencies—the Romney moves were in the right direction, but they fell considerably short of what is needed.

In the first place, he said that the responsibility for the program would be vested in the Urban Affairs Council in the White House. Mr. Romney conceded that the policy of considering HUD the first among equals in the administration of the program was not working. Moving the responsibility up to the council, where the President would be looking over the shoulders of the Cabinet members, would insure sufficient cooperation, he said. An indication of progress along this line was

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Mr. Romney's statement that each of the other departments will come up with specific Model Cities funds for the programs they operate in model neighborhoods. He did not say how much they would supply, but it is significant that they will be forced to do anything.

On the other hand, there has been no structural change in the administration of the program at the state and local level. The Secretary noted that a previously announced reorganization plan would bring the regional offices of the various departments into a single location and would make their jurisdictions coincide, and expressed his belief that this would be helpful.

It is highly questionable, however, whether this move, or the announced intention to bring the states into the Model Cities planning will eliminate the endemic bickering at the local or state level. As for the regional offices, HUD will still be the first among equals in trying to make the program go—a concept the Secretary admitted did not work in Washington, and which isn't likely to work anywhere else.

If the local poverty agency, the model city agency run by the mayor, the state department of employment security and the state department of education, both run by the governor, fight over money, programs and clients, there is no way, in the present system, or the envisioned system, to do anything about it. There is, in fact, no single person with real responsibility for the program below President Nixon himself.

Until there is, and until there is more money available, the moves Mr. Romney has taken will also not amount to much more than bureaucratic footwork, more choreography.

ANTI-UNION HOSPITALS

BLUE CROSS PAYS THE BILLS

JOEL SELDIN

Mr. Seldin was a member of the editorial staff of the New York Herald Tribune *from 1947 to 1965. His specialized reportorial assignments included labor unions and health-insurance programs.*

Nearly 1 million nonprofessional hospital workers in this country's voluntary and private hospitals are so poorly paid that if they work five days a week for a full year, and if they are the sole support of a family, its annual income will be below the official level of poverty. If some union or group of unions were to attempt a large-scale organizing campaign (only one-eighth of these workers are now unionized) and if the hospitals were to oppose the unions with large and expensive anti-union campaigns, the employers could recover much of this expense from the Medicare, Medicaid and Blue Cross health insurance programs.

The situation is a classic example of how the social advances of one era can contribute to social problems later. It contains a note of irony because the unions were among the most active advocates of the public and nonprofit health insurance programs, and because a large percentage of Blue Cross membership, now exceeding 65 million, is enrolled through labor-management agreements. It also illustrates some of the complexity that underlies what seems to the uninitiated to be apathy or resistance when unions fail to respond enthusiastically to admonitions that they should organize the unorganized.

A hospital management's potential for recovering the costs of opposing a union exists largely because of formulas used by the health insurance plans to determine a rate of reimbursement that will be fair to both the insured and the hospitals. In theory, the plans should pay the hospitals only the actual cost of whatever service the patient requires. In practice, with an institution as large and complex as a modern medical center, where many intangible elements relate to the quality of patient-care services, and where costs vary even within a single year, determining the precise cost of services to an individual patient is a bookkeeping impossibility. The formulas, which are supposed to determine equitable averages that will include the indirect as well as the direct costs of services, all include an appropriate portion of a hospital's administrative costs, among them personnel and legal costs. Anti-union expenses are ordinarily listed in those categories, but are rarely if ever specified as such.

Despite all the recent concern about health-care services and costs, statistics are still inadequate and late. Some perspective on the insurance-unionism problem can be gained, however, from the figures for 1967, the latest full year available when this was written. In 1967, $16.4 billion was spent for hospital care, of which $13.6 billion went to hospitals most likely to serve insured patients. These "general and other special" hospitals are, incidentally, also the ones most likely to have employees in need of unionization. Medicare payments to hospitals in that period were $3.4 billion, and Blue Cross paid out $2.8 billion. Medicaid's payments, which are smaller, still amounted to some hundreds of millions of dollars. Together, the three insurance plans covered more than half the nation's cost for general and other special hospitals.

Private insurance companies and private patients without insurance presumably would also be charged by the hospitals for anti-union expenses, but this is more like

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the usual pattern of private employers charging off such costs to operating expenses or adding them to prices. The public and nonprofit plans maintain an aura of commitment to the public welfare that would seem to exclude the underwriting of anti-union activities.

It is almost impossible for a union to organize public hospitals (federal, state, county and municipal institutions) whose employees are covered by civil service or some similar employment system, the provisions of which extend to other hospitals not being organized or to other than hospital workers. Consequently, the ability of public hospitals to fend off a union is not likely to depend on whether they can recoup the expense through health insurance plans, unless they happen to be single units.

When a hospital elects to oppose the unionization of its employees, the costs of the campaign are incurred in a number of ways. There can be greater than usual pay increases to convince the workers that the union is unnecessary. If the workers feel the lack of representation in bringing their grievances before management, procedures alternative to the usual union mechanisms are devised and can require more supervisory time for this activity, perhaps at overtime rates, additional supervisory employees, or both. The costs of meetings, leaflets, direct mail and similar "informational" activities are also frequently substantial. Such expenditures are usually listed as personnel expense.

But the principal cost item in an anti-union campaign is likely to be legal expense. Initially, the planning and administration of such a campaign is most often turned over to one of the "new breed" of labor attorneys, whose specialty is thwarting union organizing drives. Their retainers, expenses and fees are generally high, and they are apt to appear on the hospital's books as legal fees for unspecified purposes. When, as is increasingly the case, the dispute between management and union becomes a "case" before a state or other local labor relations board, or goes to the courts, additional trial counsel may be required. An anti-union campaign that was intended to cover a few months before a union election can easily stretch out over years before the courts and administrative agencies are through with it.

Officials of Medicare, Medicaid and Blue Cross, asked about how their accounting and auditing procedures would deal with the expenses of a hospital's anti-union campaign, agreed (*1*) that it was unlikely such expenses would be identifiable in hospital cost records as they are now submitted to the plans; (*2*) that if an auditor identified the nature of such costs he would be concerned with little more than verifying that the expenses were billed by and paid to legitimate firms or lawyers; and (*3*) that no policy on reimbursing for anti-union expenses has been created and that, in the absence of such policy, it is probable that the appropriate percentage of the costs would be reimbursed.

Privately, the officials felt it would be extremely difficult for any insurance plan to attempt to differentiate proper from improper costs in a labor-management situation. One of them offered the hypothetical case of the cost of moving patients from a struck hospital to assure continuity of care. "How could we disallow such costs when our primary responsibility is to provide health care for our members?" Still, they all agreed that expenses for fighting a union's organizing drive were in a somewhat different category and would pose a problem for the plans.

In the formula of the Associated Hospital Service of New York, which is only one of some 100 Blue Cross plans in the nation, there are some stipulations which could serve to limit a hospital's ability to recover anti-union expenses. These limitations, however, apply to how much added cost a hospital can submit for reimbursement in a given period; they are not related to the nature of anti-union expenses.

The New York Blue Cross Plan assigns hospitals serving its members to groups according to such criteria as: the annual number of patient days; the number of full-time residents in an approved program and the number of their specialties; whether there is an approved intern program and nursing school and the content of their curricula; whether there are licensed outpatient departments and emergency services, and whether the hospitals are voluntary (nonprofit) or proprietary (profit-making). Those with more services related to patient care get a higher rate, and the proprietaries are allowed 7.5 per cent profit on assets used for patient care. In all, there are sixteen groups of hospitals in the New York plan's formula. Within each group, no hospital is reimbursed for expenses that are in excess of 15 per cent above the annual average per diem reimbursable expense for that group.

In addition, the reimbursable expenses of an individual hospital may not exceed by more than 20 per cent the average annual increase in expenses of the other hospitals with which it is grouped. Finally, the aggregate AHS payment to a hosital in one year is not allowed to exceed what the hospital would have charged the AHS members if it billed them as private patients.

In the absence of any direct experience with the question of reimbursing for anti-union expenses, the AHS officials guessed that if a hospital's expenses were low by comparison with those of others in its group, it would be in a better position to obtain Blue Cross reimbursement for expenses incurred fighting a union. Another possiblity, however, would be for a hospital to assign its supervisors to devoting more of their regular time to an anti-union campaign, to allocate some of its regular budget for legal services to the activity, or in other ways to substitute the anti-union campaign for other, continuing activities in the hospital's program. If this did not impair patient services sufficiently to affect the hospital's accreditation, they said, the anti-union costs would not show up as additional expenses or in any way as unusual. So long as the hospital kept its costs within the allowable maximum for its position in the formula, or attributed its anti-union costs to the deficit

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which most hospitals maintain, they felt, little attention would be paid to such costs.

The New York State Insurance Department has jurisdiction over the AHS formula, as well as the formulas of seven other Blue Cross plans in the state, each of which is somewhat different. In addition, the Insurance Department checks the reimbursements provided to individual hospitals, working with the cost figures provided by the hospitals to the Blue Cross plans, and also with cost figures provided by the hospitals to the state's Department of Health. Spokesmen for the Insurance Department said there was no provision in the Health Department cost reports to make anti-union expenses more visible than in the Blue Cross reports.

"Normally," one Insurance Department official said, "an administrative expense would not be questioned. Whether it is a justifiable expense is a question that starts with whether the Blue Cross plan is willing to accept the expense."

Unlike the Blue Cross plans, the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs set rates for each hospital individually without reference to groups. The basic reimbursement formula is set by the Medicare program and, in practice, followed also by Medicaid, with appropriate adjustments for the difference between the two patient groups. Medicare, for example, since it serves patients over 65, will not reimburse a hospital for the costs of its obstetrical, nursery and child-care facilities.

The "general principle" of reimbursement as stated in the Medicare regulations is that the payments are to be based on "reasonable cost," both direct and indirect, of providing service to patients covered by the insurance. Despite some 30 pages of intricate regulations dealing with such subjects as depreciation, interest expense, bad debts, charity, courtesy allowances, cost of educational activities and cost of research, there is nothing that refers directly to anything resembling an anti-union campaign. However, one section is entitled, "Allowance in lieu of specific recognition of other costs," under which, after allowable interest expenses are deducted, voluntary hospitals are permitted to add an additional 2 per cent to their bill, and proprietary hospitals (already allowed a complicated profit rate) an additional 1.5 per cent. It is estimated that some $100 million annually is involved in these additional percentages alone.

When the new Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Robert H. Finch tried earlier this year to drop these "in lieu of" charges, he was barraged by protests from members of the American Hospital Association and the American Nursing Home Association. He agreed to review the Medicare reimbursement formula for purposes of making it reflect more accurately the actual costs to the hospitals of patient care. Whether this will increase or decrease payments is still to be seen.

Officials involved with Medicare-Medicaid said there has not yet been, to their knowledge, a case in which anti-union costs were questioned in the reimbursement process. They disagreed somewhat on how the question would be handled if it did come up. One said he thought such costs would not be permissible under "the intent of the legislation," but another felt the agency could not "judge the motivation" of such expenses and that they would be handled "according to the formula." A third felt that despite the lack of "specific procedural barriers" to reimbursement of such costs, there would be "a degree of sensitivity" to whether such costs are "related to patient care."

Whether or not the question will ever come up for Medicare and Medicaid may depend, to a great extent, on the national system of Blue Cross plans. When the Medicare legislation was being debated in Congress, the principal opposition came from the powerful lobby of the private insurance companies. To overcome this opposition, Congress wrote into the law an opportunity for "third parties" to participate in the federal program. As a result, hospitals may elect to have a "fiscal intermediary" between themselves and the Social Security Administration for reimbursement purposes. These intermediaries process and pay the hospitals' bills, applying the federal formula, and are paid for their services.

The private companies have not been eager to get into this aspect of the program. Of 7,900 hospitals participating in Medicare by a recent count, 6,900 had elected the national Blue Cross Association, in Chicago, to be their intermediary. Of the remaining 1,000 hospitals, 639 deal directly with the SSA and the rest through some private insurance company or nonprofit organization other than Blue Cross. Although there are no figures, one HEW official felt the percentage of hospital beds being reimbursed by Medicare through Blue Cross was even higher than the percentage of hospitals.

This means that the initial determination of whether anti-union expenses are reimbursable under the Medicare formula will, in most cases, be made by Blue Cross. Only if Blue Cross decides to question anti-union expenses—if it can find them—could the process be started easily of getting a decision from the HEW attorneys on whether the government has the right to refuse payment.

This potential reimbursement of anti-union costs becomes a problem for the unionization of the unorganized only if the hospitals mount really expensive anti-union campaigns. The response of officials in Charleston, S.C., where a recognition strike has dragged on for months, may be attributable both to their being the heads of public hospitals and to the intransigence of the Deep South. However, the evidence in a New York City dispute between Local 1199, Drug and Hospital Employees Union, and Roosevelt Hospital, one of the largest voluntaries in a "union town," cannot similarly be dismissed as atypical. It is reviewed here to indicate what can be anticipated by way of hospital response, at least in a significant number of cases, should a major unionization effort among hospital workers be undertaken nationally.

The Roosevelt case, well publicized in hospital circles and being studied as a prototype, is now being argued before the New York State Labor Relations Board, which is considering charges of unfair labor practice against the

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hospital. It is already more than three years old, with legal expenses for the entire period. If either side decides to contest the board's eventual ruling in the courts, those expenses could continue to mount. The hospital is represented by Poletti Freidin Prashker Feldman & Gartner, one of the city's larger firms specializing in labor law. Its fees are not nominal.

In February, Frank Einhorn, a trial examiner for the board, issued an intermediate report after forty-eight days of hearings between October 1967 and June 1968. The evidence he considered pertinent and the conclusions he reached, provide a judicious appraisal of what occurred.

According to Mr. Einhorn's report the union, which had failed at Roosevelt once before in 1964, began a second organizing drive in April 1966. The objective was to sign up a majority of employees other than doctors, nurses and supervisors on cards designating Local 1199 as their representative. Under state law, such a majority showing would require the management to negotiate.

At about the time the union began its drive, the hospital announced an increase in its minimum hourly wage and a 4 per cent wage increase for all nonprofessional employees, which the union charged was an unfair practice. Mr. Einhorn rejected this charge on the ground that the hospital did not yet know about the union drive. He also rejected a similar charge against an increase in Roosevelt's life insurance coverage from $2,000 to $5,000 and an increase in shift differential from $1.50 to $2 because he found that plans for the increases had been made before the organizing began.

Also rejected were charges against some seventeen speeches to employees by Peter P. Terenzio, chief executive officer of the hospital, in January 1967, shortly before an election ordered by the board. Mr. Terenzio told the workers that under the union they would: lose a nurses' assistant grade, between aide and practical nurse; have to wait for wage increases until unionized hospitals caught up to Roosevelt's pay scales; suffer the elimination of merit increases or increases between labor grades; be required to pay dues, participate in strikes, picketing and union meetings, and might have to be discharged if they refused. He urged them to vote against the union. The examiner found the speeches were within an employer's rights.

Mr. Einhorn also threw out charges against a bilingual housekeeping supervisor, Oscar Martinez, who told some twenty Spanish-speaking employees, at a meeting in the head supervisor's office, to vote against the union. Martinez also explained that the two pay checks they had received that week, one for $4 and the other for the rest of their pay, was to show them what it would be like to have union dues deducted from their checks. He did not tell them that the dues were monthly, not weekly. He provided refreshments at the meeting from a petty cash fund. Mr. Martinez "decided to give his views about the Union," Mr. Einhorn wrote, "because he felt that the Spanish-speaking people are the victims of organized labor and he should explain to them about the Union and comparative wages." The examiner did not look into how Mr. Martinez came to Roosevelt from a unionized hospital, and how he became a supervisor in a relatively short time, although both facts appear in the report. Apparently such events are expected in an anti-union campaign and are not considered illegal.

But Mr. Einhorn could not accept as proper a 10 per cent across-the-board pay increase announced by Roosevelt in September 1966, just five months after the 4 per cent increase and one day after the union had shown to the board and to the hospital representation cards for a majority of the Roosevelt employees. Nor could the examiner accept as justified the hospital's refusal of an immediate election and the steps it took to delay the election until the following January. He rejected the hospital's argument that it was protecting its employees by the delay, and noted that after four months of the organizing campaign most workers had made up their minds and were ready to vote. He also noted that the delay, coupled with the 10 per cent pay increase, had made it possible for Mr. Terenzio in his January speeches (the same talks that were not in themselves illegal) to declare that Roosevelt's pay rates were higher than those in unionized hospitals. Mr. Einhorn found that the pay increase was a violation of the state labor law.

The forty-eight-day hearing produced other findings against the hospital, the details of which illustrate the intricacy and expense of an anti-union campaign. When the election was finally held on January 12, 1967, the union lost by a vote of 377 to 220 in a bargaining unit of 650 employees, and immediately charged that the procedure had been unfair. At that point the board began inspecting the 380 representation cards the union had submitted the previous September, and found that 345 of them

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had been signed by persons in the unit, and that the signatures appeared the same as those in the hospital's records. The cards thus became evidence for the hearing into alleged election malpractice.

The hospital's attorneys asked first for photostats of the cards, and later for the cards themselves, ostensibly so that the signatures could be inspected by a handwriting expert. The examiners permitted the attorneys to have the cards. Although it appeared that the cards were inspected by an expert, the hospital did not contest the validity of the signatures. What it did do is a good indication of the nature of an anti-union campaign. The hospital attorneys attempted to prove that although the employees had signed the cards, they did not understand what the cards meant. Toward this end, they induced sixty-three of the workers to testify that they thought signing the cards merely meant asking for an election, and not that the union should represent them. How this was accomplished is best described by Mr. Einhorn:

> The employees were confronted by the Respondent on Hospital premises with the very same card they had signed or a photostat thereof. . . . Had I been apprized that these cards were to be used for a purpose other than submission to the handwriting expert, I would have insisted upon assurances that their use be restricted, otherwise permission would not have been granted for removal of the cards. It is generally recognized that an employer may question his employees in preparation for a hearing. But such preparation is restricted to questions relevant to the charges of unfair labor practices and of sufficient probative value to justify the risk of intimidation which interrogation as to union matters necessarily entails. . . . There is testimony herein that employees were interrupted by their supervisors in the performance of their duties and, without being told why and without any choice, they were required to report to the office where they were greeted by the Hospital inquisitor. Mingled with apprehension at this approach by the Respondent was resentment towards the Union. Employees when they signed a card believed, and rightly so, that the cards they signed would be held confidential by the Union. . . . An election had been conducted and lost by the Union and long after that event, the employees found themselves confronted by their employer with a card they had signed favoring the Union. They cannot be held knowledgeable of the legal proceeding then in progress. All they knew and saw was that the Union, after having lost the election, had violated a trust. . . .

Mr. Einhorn found no credible evidence that the union had misrepresented the meaning of the cards when it asked the Roosevelt workers to sign them. He felt the critical point was what the workers had thought when they signed the cards, not afterward. He ruled that they had understood the meaning of the cards when they signed them and that the union, when it submitted them, had signed up a majority of the workers. He rejected the hospital's contention that it had declined to recognize the union majority because of "good faith" doubt as to the validity of the cards, and found the hospital guilty of refusal to bargain.

It is in his proposed solution that the examiner, if he is sustained by the board, will establish an important precedent for hospital organizing. Instead of ordering a new election, he declared that the hospital's "vulpine conduct succeeded in both delaying an election and undermining the union. . . . I find that the election . . . was not a fair election and the Respondent's conduct herein has destroyed the required laboratory conditions for any fair election for some time to come. A reasonable vindication of the Act and its purpose will best be served by returning the Union and the Respondent to the *status quo ante* the unfair labor practices and compelling the Respondent to commence bargaining."

In short, Mr. Einhorn, in his recommendations to the board, rejected entirely the lost election, declared the original showing of majority status by the union to have been valid, and directed the hospital to reach a collective bargaining agreement with the union, an action taken only once before in the state.

Just three days before the SLRB hearing, the United States Supreme Court upheld the principle that when an employer has undermined the election process, after a union has signed up a majority of workers, labor relations boards can issue a direct order to the employer to recognize the union and bargain. There had been conflicting rulings in different United States Circuit Courts. The Roosevelt Hospital attorney, Mr. Moss, argued before the SLRB that this ruling did not really apply in the SLRB's case, indicating that should the board rule against him there is a good chance of an appeal to the courts. He also objected strenuously to Mr. Einhorn's report and recommendations, charging that the trial examiner was not "objective," and that all of his and the hospital's actions in the case had been scrupulously legal.

Should the outcome finally be in favor of the union there will be additional complications involving the reimbursement of anti-union costs through public and nonprofit insurance plans. Although there is no direct recognition of union considerations in the Medicare and Medicaid legislation, there is an overall intent of Congress in other laws to encourage unionism. Medicare and Medicaid officials will be hard pressed if it develops that one effect of their programs counteracts what Congress intended in other actions.

For Blue Cross, particularly in New York State, there will also be complications. The State Insurance and Health Departments, with some supervisory powers over both the hospitals and the insurance plans, will find that they have been approving payments for practices that a sister state agency, the Labor Relations Board, has found to be illegal. State and federal officials said they had no idea how these quandaries can be solved. They felt the solutions will have to be devised either by the legal staffs of their agencies or, possibly, through new legislation in Congress or in state legislatures.

It seems reasonable to expect that it will be some years before all the complexities of this contradictory situation are ironed out. Meanwhile, organizing the unorganized in the hospitals will remain a far more difficult problem than merely persuading some union to go out and sign up members.

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

The American Economic Empire

THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM. *By Harry Magdoff. Monthly Review Press. 208 pp. $6.*

JAMES O'CONNOR

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Readers will search the index of John Kenneth Galbraith's "international best-seller," *The New Industrial State*, in vain for any references to "multinational corporations," "international finance," "foreign trade," "foreign aid," "Europe" and "underdeveloped countries," not to speak of "imperialism" and "economic exploitation." Galbraith's failure to acknowledge that the United States economy does not exist as a separate economic entity, and that there are no national economies, only one world capitalist economy, reveals the inadequacy of contemporary bourgeois economic theory.

The problem is not that economists such as Galbraith are incapable of learning from the alternative tradition, Marxism, which is attracting more and more young economists who are fed up with their professors and seek viable alternatives to Keynesian and Marshallian economics. The problem is rather that bourgeois economic theory, committed as it is to defending capitalism and to using all its resources to figure out ways of saving capitalism, is incapable of making an accurate assessment of the facts of economic life.

Studies of the distribution of poverty among races, age groups and occupational categories parade as studies of the causes of poverty. Studies of the impact of government spending obscure the causes of government spending. "Welfare economics" blossoms as economic and social welfare deteriorate. Tax economists spin out complex theories of "equity" and "ability to pay" while private capital escapes the mounting tax burden. International trade theory clings tenaciously to the fantasy that international specialization and the division of labor benefit all parties to trade and investment, even though it is a plain historic fact that the economic development of the advanced industrial economies contributed to the economic underdevelopment of the Third World. Hundreds of young economists realize today that bourgeois economics is thoroughly reactionary, useful only to the corporate ruling class in its search for ways to keep the dollar as the world's reserve currency, make tax exploitation more efficient, maintain the "correct" mix of unemployment and inflation, keep the underdeveloped countries in their place, co-opt the black movement at home and, last but not least, blame the problems of capitalism on workers whose wage demands "threaten" profits, "cause" inflation and are "instrumental" in worsening the balance of payments.

The Age of Imperialism deserves the highest praise as an outstanding description of the American economic empire. It is indispensable reading for anyone uncomfortable with the distortions about the world economy dispensed by the so-called professional economists. Harry Magdoff's book does not make any new theoretical advances (nor does it pretend to), either in the sense of clarifying and developing older theory or breaking new ground. But *The Age of Imperialism* is the first book to put together relevant facts about American economic imperialism in a clear, concise form.

The first outstanding fact is that a fortress America, especially one that believed its own strictures about the evils of "government interference in the economy," could not survive without undergoing the most profound economic, and subsequent social and political upheavals. In the first place, Magdoff demonstrates what the vanguard corporate leaders have long known—that the metropolitan economy is increasingly dependent on overseas supplies of industrial raw materials. Imports of basic metals such as iron ore, copper, lead and zinc expand more rapidly than local supplies. Imports account for over 80 per cent of the supplies of well over one-half of the industrial materials classified as "strategic." And most of these materials are taken out of the ground in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

In the second place, although U.S. exports make up only 5 per cent of gross national product,* exports *plus* sales by overseas branch plants and subsidiaries of U.S. corporations constitute a vast and rapidly growing market abroad. Magdoff estimates that this market "is equal to approximately two-fifths the domestic output of farms, factories, and mines." Here we locate the central importance of the huge, new foreign investments in manufacturing and related industries, in specific, the ability of U.S. corporations to compete in, and control, foreign markets directly. To be sure, most of these investments are located in Europe and Canada, where the great mass markets are to be found. But many sales of U.S. affiliates in Europe find their way to the Third World; what is more, U.S. corporations have successfully penetrated the thin markets which are available in the underdeveloped countries. [See "Mexican Auto Swindle" by Leo Fenster, *The Nation*, June 2.]

Thirdly, and related to the expansion of markets overseas, U.S. foreign investments have been expanding more rapidly than domestic investments, accounting for about 8 per cent of total investments in 1957 and 17 per cent of all investments in 1965. Earnings on foreign investments jumped from 10 per cent of after-tax corporate profits in 1950 to 22 per cent in 1964.

Fourthly, capital goods industries, the basic infra-structure of the American economy, are particularly dependent on exports and on sales to the federal government—mainly direct military purchases and sales of equipment and materials destined for military production. It is well known that industries such as aircraft, ordnance, electronic components, scientific and controlling industries and radio, TV and communications equipment could not survive without government contracts and direct and indirect subsidies. It is less well known that nonferrous metal ores mining, coal mining, nonferrous metal manufacturing, engines and turbines, construction, mining and oil field machinery, and other major capital goods industries sell up to 40 per cent of their output abroad or to the government.

Lastly, and what needs to penetrate deeply into the popular consciousness: overseas investments, markets of foreign-based plants of U.S. corporations, raw material supplies, military orders and commodity exports financed by the U.S. Agency for International Development are all monopolized by a handful of giant corporations. Of the fifty largest

* In my view, the term "gross national product" is a mystification. There is a single world capitalist system and thus a single world social product. The U.S. "gross national product" measures the share of world social product appropriated by the United States. "Gross national product" is thus a measure of distribution, not production.

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industrial corporations, thirty-seven are deeply involved in international operations or military production or both. These companies are concentrated in oil, aviation, chemicals, steel, automobiles, electrical equipment and electronics, and rubber. Magdoff rightly stresses that these corporations' "community of interests" is based on "the interrelationship among the firms via the financial centers of power . . . the direct economic ties [between the federal government and] business. . . . And . . . the postwar merger movement among the industrial giants [which] has intermingled the typically domestic with the typically outer-market directed business organizations."

In short, it is precisely the men who control the largest and most powerful corporations who have the greatest stake in economic expansion abroad, together with the maintenance of a world-wide military network to protect their far-flung economic interests. Thanks to the recent work of radical historians and sociologists, we know that these are also the men who constitute the U.S. upper class, dominate nearly all of the country's major institutions, and effectively control the Executive branch of the federal government. So long as these men continue to rule there can be no major changes in either the foreign or domestic policies of the federal government, precisely because these policies are formed by the corporate ruling group on the basis of their own *interests*.

The second outstanding fact effectively obscured by bourgeois economists is that the American empire is in trouble economically. Space permits brief examination of only one of the many stresses and strains which are beginning to tear the empire apart, in particular one described by Magdoff in "The Financial Network," the most interesting chapter of his book.

Despite the growth of sales of overseas branches of U.S. corporations, superior productivity in the most technologically advanced industries, and export subsidies, U.S. commodity exports have not grown fast enough to pay for military expenditures abroad, military assistance and economic "aid" to underdeveloped countries, and foreign investments. But foreigners have accepted the dollar as a reserve asset, and hence the United States has been able to carry balance of payments deficits financed by an expansion of internal credit. Because foreigners have not "cashed in" all the dollars they hold for gold—that is, because U.S. dominance of world trade means that the United States has assumed the role of world banker—the U.S. economy has enjoyed unprecedented prosperity despite the costs of defending the American empire abroad. Had other countries failed to accept the dollar as a reserve asset, in the words of former Under Secretary of the Treasury Robert Roosa, "we might have been forced long ago to cut down our imports (perhaps through deflation in our economy), reduce materially our foreign investments, income from which make a substantial contribution to our current balance of payments, and curtail, perhaps sharply, our military and economic assistance to our friends and allies. . . . Instead of the rapid growth of world trade, we would have witnessed stagnation that would have been harmful to our own prosperity and to that of the whole free world."

Thus the cooperation of central bankers abroad, especially in the other industrial countries, has been absolutely decisive in keeping American imperialism intact—that is, in affording the opportunity for rapid overseas expansion on the one hand, and maintaining the "corporate liberal" consensus at home through regular increases in wages, on the other.

Immediately after World War II, of course, the central bankers had no choice in the matter. Even today, the last thing the European bankers and businessmen want is a depression in the United States. Yet to the degree that their own economies are running out of steam, and to the degree that they no longer fear the Soviet Union (and hence no longer need the military umbrella provided by the United States), they can be expected to defend their own national interests, perhaps mounting a large-scale offensive against U.S. economic hegemony.

Since Magdoff wrote his book, a two-price system for gold has been introduced under the prodding of the United States, and the decline in real wages in this country has shown no signs of abating. These are signs that the dollar continues to weaken, and that the system as a whole is beginning to be buffeted by winds which may reach gale force. More stopgap measures can be expected. In the last analysis, however, the détente with the Soviet Union and growing economic stagnation in Europe may signal the outbreak of national rivalries characteristic of an earlier day, obviously not in the form of imperialist wars but rather in the form of extremist nationalist economic policies which today are not considered "polite" in international ruling circles. This then is one weak link in the chain of U.S. imperialism. On the one hand, economic, political and military dominance tends to weaken the European economies and to force the Soviet Union into a "cooperative" stance. On the other hand, an economically weak Europe, unafraid of Soviet "aggression" and indifferent to China and U.S. interests in Asia, may be compelled to undermine the hegemony of the dollar, and thus one of the key pillars of the American empire.

These then are but two of the contributions—the author's description of the American empire and the role of the dollar—of *The Age of Imperialism*. Valuable as well are Magdoff's account of the economics of U.S. open-door policies, the extensive U.S. banking network abroad, foreign aid as an instrument of

THE MIRACLE OF THE FRESCOES SAVED FROM THE FLOOD

First nothing but angels
Holding cups of blood,
Wounds, crosses,
Saints and parables,
The busy and the damned.
Slowly the colors
Seep into my mind.
Some of the sinners,
Less preoccupied,
See me staring at them.
Gradually, the Virgins seem not so concerned
With the Last Judgment.
Then the calves and buttocks of the men,
The thighs, eyes,
Hands of everyone,
Remove themselves from the walls.
Even the eccentric halos
Around the Jewish-Italian faces
Become believable;
And Jesus, a human being,
Sitting with his friends,
No more betrayed than anyone.

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control of underdeveloped countries, the reactionary role of the International Monetary Fund, and the new patterns of dependence of the underdeveloped countries on the industrial powers.

The Age of Imperialism is in no sense an exhaustive study of the American empire. Magdoff devotes little or no space to the impact of the giant international corporations on the economies of Europe and the underdeveloped world, in particular with regard to the degree and pattern of economic resource utilization. Little is said about the significance of the industrialization programs of the larger underdeveloped countries, and practically nothing about the internal functioning of the U.S. economy. Nor does the author attempt to assess the significance of either the development of the conglomerate, international corporation on the imperialist system as a whole, or the meaning of the extensive cooperation undertaken by the giant corporations based in Europe, the United States, and Japan—that is, he does not take up the problem of whether or not the growth of an "international ruling class" is tending to make extreme national rivalries a thing of the past.

No criticism of *The Age of Imperialism* is intended by this brief list, merely a suggested inventory of some outstanding problems. Magdoff set himself the task of sketching the major contours of the American economic empire in order to dispel the myth that "economic imperialism *is not* at the root of United States foreign policy." He succeeds admirably.

The Sanctuary of Imagination

HENRY JAMES: The Treacherous Years, 1895-1901. *By Leon Edel. J. B. Lippincott Co. 381 pp. $10.*

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The publication of Volume IV in his life of Henry James marks the completion for Leon Edel of forty years' research on his subject. The present volume in particular, with its attempt to provide the key to Henry James's heart, represents the harvest of the biographer's patient and sympathetic identification with the artist. Despite the undoubted difficulties of this long quest for the secret of a writer who dreaded personal exposure and did everything to cover his tracks, Edel's writing shows few strains. The poised urbanity of the narrative contrasts sharply with the muddlement of James himself in these years of crisis.

The current volume, the most inward of the series, is devoted in considerable part to psychoanalytic studies of the stories and novels. Edel argues in his preface that inquiry into the writer's most private fantasies is the proper function of literary biography. "All the rest" he dismisses as "gossip and anecdotage." Such snobbism has its disadvantages. One of the problems of this volume is Edel's propensity to interpret, his overeagerness to explain, point analogies, create patterns. Yet at his best Edel provides a useful account of the surface as well as the buried life.

The external narrative is uneven in interest and sometimes difficult to follow, but the opening section on James's years as a playwright is especially vivid and tightly woven, with its thumbnail portraits of Shaw, Wells and Arnold Bennett, and views of Wilde and Ibsen. In this part Edel writes dramatically himself, suggesting the larger tissue of relations by means of symbolic detail, and building toward the great catastrophe: the disaster of the opening night of *Guy Domville*, Saturday, January 5, 1895, when James was hooted off the stage by an angry audience. Shaw or Wilde would have held his ground and outwitted the hecklers, but James was shattered. He would remember the event as "the most horrible hour of my life." It was the act of violence that, deep within him, this novelist with his "imagination of disaster" had always, anxiously, awaited.

The hurt initiated a long period of profound bewilderment and withdrawal and a fundamental crisis in James's sense of himself. Psychological breakdown was nothing new in this brilliant and neurotic family. The elder Henry James had suffered a great "vastation" and for two years had been visited by a recurrent sense, as he said, of "perfectly insane and abject terror." Henry's older brother William, when he was 28, had experienced an overwhelming sensation of dread, which he recorded in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. Edel's *The Treacherous Years* is also a story of spiritual death and rebirth, a narrative of conversion and the twice-born self.

What was James doing writing for the theatre that "abyss of vulgarity and platitude," as he called it? Money was a reason, but he dreamed also of popular success. In his childhood competition with William, Henry had learned early the danger of masculine assertion and had retreated into a view of himself as powerless and not quite a real boy. Despite this abdication, however, he retained a "compelling drive to masculinity," as Edel writes, and the dramatic interlude appears now as his last bid to break the pattern of his ivory-tower fastidiousness and impose himself as a man in the world. We find James in his 50s voraciously reading biographies of Napoleon and memoirs of his generals. But *Guy Domville* repeated the example of earlier failures and proved to be the Waterloo of James's worldly career.

The novelist moved now from his De Vere Gardens flat in London to "Lamb House," Rye. Edel writes eloquently about this ancient and beautiful corner of Sussex, although I miss any mention of James's friendship with Stephen Crane, a near neighbor in Hastings until his death in 1900. We get a sense from James's letters how very important this house and the countryside were in helping him settle his confusions. "It is delightfully quiet and quaint and simple and salubrious," he writes William, "and the bliss of the rural solitude and peace and beauty are a balm to my spirit." A favorite in fashionable London society for twenty years, the inveterate guest who had dined out 140 times one winter "season," now James learned to ride a bicycle and nursed his spirit in his "bath of silence and solitude."

In the novels of these years there is also a marked withdrawal of interest in the outer world. The failure to conquer the stage had driven James back to the sanctuary of imagination. Unlike some artists, Hawthorne and Kafka for example, who experienced the isolation of the artist as a kind of entombment, James trusted his imagination and found it a "house of life." More than ever art became a sustaining faith and discipline. He never returned to the broad social canvases of the 1880s, the decade of *The Bostonians, The Princess Cassamassima* and *The Tragic Muse*. Now with the falling away of outer reality, there is the "surrender of experience to fantasy" which Graham Greene noted many years ago.

Reality itself is uncertain in these novels of ambiguity and conjecture, and the confusion about reality is typically a confusion about sexuality, as in *The Sacred Fount*, where the narrator spends a profitless country-house weekend studying the faces of his fellow guests for signs of who is sleeping with whom. Again and again James renders the corrupting world of adult sexuality from the point of view of a little girl. The stress is on the imaginative effort of these young innocents—there are no Lolitas here—

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to make sense of the glamorous and terrifying activities of the grownups, and the objective events themselves are left distanced and shadowy. Edel argues persuasively that James was reliving painful childhood experiences in these fables of the death of childhood, but the confrontation with the repressed past is incomplete. Except for *The Turn of the Screw*, these highly charged situations have been drained of their emotional content; and, despite the wit and charm of *What Maisie Knew* and *The Awkward Age*, we are left with a sense of their psychological aridity and evasiveness.

In his personal life James was facing the implications of his late discoveries more openly. The most poignant part of Edel's story in this volume concerns James's belated awakening to the power of sexual love. In his hunger not to have missed his life, James fell in love in the waning days of the old century with a young American sculptor, Hendrik Andersen. The androgynous quality in the novelist's make-up, what Edel calls his "spiritual transvestitism," is evident in the passionately maternal longings expressed in James's letters to this young man.

The language of these letters, of James's comments on living at Lamb House, of his "epistolary elegies" on the death of old friends remind one continually of the writer usually regarded as his opposite in American letters: Walt Whitman. James in these crisis years was reliving the death of his childhood innocence and arriving at a deeper understanding of his mortality, and also of death as the source of beauty and love. At the age of 22, reviewing Whitman's Civil War poems in *The Nation*, James had been contemptuous: "It has been a melancholy task to read this book; and it is still a more melancholy one to write about it." But in his old age he thought Whitman the greatest of American poets. In her memoirs Edith Wharton evokes the image of the novelist "crooning . . . in a mood of subdued ecstasy" Whitman's great poem on death and the awakening of the poet, "Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking."

Edel's interpretation is not persuasive in all respects. I think he mistakes the special nature of James's genius when he links him with Freud and Proust as pioneer explorers of the unconscious. But no book provides more understanding of the emotional sources of James's art and its recurrent psychological patterns. After this volume it will be impossible any longer to regard the later James as primarily a novelist of the international scene, a reporter of the surfaces of civilized society. And his conversion to the supreme sanctity of beauty and sexual love will seem to disqualify him as a Puritan moralist. He will no doubt be more and more appreciated as a visionary poet, and the great fantasies of the "major phase" will be seen not as renderings of the external scene but as projections of the vicissitudes of his own consciousness. *The Golden Bowl*, the greatest of the last three novels, will then figure for us as a magical fable of the violation and reconstitution of the imagination. In the end James found his theme. It was the traditional, the great theme: the loss and regaining of Paradise.

Landscape of the Heart

SPIRIT OF PLACE: Letters and Essays on Travel. *By Lawrence Durrell. Edited by Alan G. Thomas. E. P. Dutton & Co. 430 pp. $10.*

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For Lawrence Durrell, places are holy. Landscapes are as powerful as gods or parents; men are their creations. "We are the children of our landscape," he writes in *Justine*. "I can think of no better identification." *Spirit of Place*, the new Durrell collection, is a testament to his lifetime preoccupation with landscape. "I willingly admit to seeing characters almost as functions of a landscape," he writes in an essay in the collection. "The important determinant of any culture is after all—the spirit of place."

Durrell believes that the task of the travel writer is "to isolate the germ in the people which is expressed by their landscape." Travel becomes "a sort of science of intuitions," "the education of the sensibility." To be educated, the traveler must first identify. "Ten minutes of this sort of quiet inner identification will give you the notion of the Greek landscape which you could not get in twenty years of studying ancient Greek texts." Identification seems simple, "for all landscapes ask the same question in the same whisper. 'I am watching you—are you watching yourself in me?'" Durrell's approach is that of the outsider and the romantic; places exist for his sake. They are—as titles of his other works suggest—private countries, personal landscapes. Living on private income and public relations jobs with the British Government, Durrell identifies with the mythic elements and *status quo* of a place, and closes his eyes to social and political problems.

Throughout his life, Durrell has been moving through foreign landscapes, mirroring himself in them and recording the interaction. Born in India he spent his childhood there, his adolescence in England, his young manhood on the Greek island of Corfu. During World War II he lived in Egypt. At the close of the war he returned to Greece, to the island of Rhodes. From Rhodes he went to Argentina, Yugoslavia, Cyprus. He now lives in Provence and still travels. Not all of Durrell's landscapes have had the same effect on him: "Everyone finds his own 'correspondences,'" he writes, "landscapes where you suddenly feel bounding with ideas and others where half your soul falls asleep. . . . Writers each seem to have a personal landscape of the heart which beckons them." For Durrell, landscapes seem to be either death- or life-giving. In Yugoslavia, Argentina, especially in England, and even in Egypt, he felt suffocated, uncreative. Durrell's landscape of the heart, the landscape that first nourished his art and that always seems to draw him back, is the Greek island.

Alan Thomas, Durrell's old friend, has edited a Durrell collage—a seemingly casual mixture of disparate materials that recalls the mixture in *The Alexandria Quartet*. Italicized biographical material, arranged by chronology and by place, prefaces some sections. There are letters as rich and as intriguing as the published correspondence with Henry Miller; vivid travel pieces; joyful illustrations by Durrell of some of his landscapes. Poems are interspersed, like the cryptic "Solange," that links sex and cosmology.

Thomas includes two early surrealistic pieces, "Zero" and "Asylum in the Snow," and selections from two of Durrell's little known early novels, *Pied Piper of Lovers* and *Panic Spring*. These four works, all written in the late 1930s, are marked by the same skyrocketing imagination that later powered the *Quartet*. Characters, motifs, symbols, foreshadow the *Quartet*'s creations. Ruth, the dying young girl who appears in both early novels, is a predecessor of Melissa. Tarquin, the homosexual schoolmaster in *Panic Spring*, appears in Durrell's *Black Book* and perhaps as Balthazar in the *Quartet*. In his early works, Durrell, already experimenting with timelessness, merges past and present. In "Zero," he delves into mysticism. He desires to bring to the West the message of the Eastern mystic: "Come. Enter into the creative activity in which you do not need your

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understandings. Do not mistake truth for the possessive process any longer—ratiocination, knowledge. The real desire is *to be possessed.*" As in the *Quartet,* in "Asylum in the Snow," Durrell explodes personality. Diving into the spring of the unconscious, he becomes five—Fifi, Hamlet, Pieter, Vasec and the Dancer—figures of all sexes, figures of the imagination. "It is not making what goes on outside," Durrell writes in this early work. "It is what occurs in the inside spirits, where the great beings make their territory."

Inside Durrell's work is a quest for a self in union with the universe, a self-created godlike Eastern being antithetical to modern Western man. Durrell's writings are attempts to "deliver" this self. "Down the Styx," another surrealistic piece included in the new collection, records a journey through the rivers of death toward just such a rebirth. At the conclusion, there is a womb, and "the body of a young boy, lying in a pool of blood. . . . He is the first-born." He is the same boy who, at the conclusion of *The Black Book,* written twenty years earlier, is reborn—without parents—out of the dead land, England, into the landscape of his heart's desire, the Greek island.

As a catalyst for rebirth, Durrell seems to need union with stony, sun-washed landscapes, landscapes like the Greek island or Provence, or the place of his birth and childhood, India. His repeated attempts to identify with landscapes like that of the Greek island seem, in part, a result of his longing for the childhood landscape. Uprooted from the foot of the Himalayas at the age of 11 and transplanted to the gray sidewalks of England, Durrell remembers India as a dazzling and holy place. Unhappy in England, he envisioned himself as a foreigner whose "real" self England was murdering. Corfu, the Greek island to which he went after "escaping" England, seems to have been potentially a return to the lost self. Island scenes in many of Durrell's works suggest that his longing for the island masks a longing for the Eden of childhood. There may even be an Oedipal aspect to that longing. In the conclusion of the *Quartet,* for example, Darley (the main author-identification figure) must cut Clea and himself away from a perfect but sterile island retreat in order to grow up.

Like his own description of Miller, Durrell is "the type of creative man who is *making use* of his art in order to grow by it." Durrell uses landscape and landscape writing to create and explore a self-image. His places are "spirited" by his compulsion to project himself as a mythic being enveloped by an immortal landscape.

Weimar and Edinburgh

A HEBRIDEAN IN GOETHE'S WEIMAR. *By A. Gillies. Blackwells (England). Distributed by Barnes & Noble. 168 pp. $6.50.*

GOETHE AND HIS AGE. *By Georg Lukacs. Translated by Robert Anchor. Grosset & Dunlap. 253 pp. $6.95.*

MARTIN GREEN

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Though both these books are about Weimar, and both are by professors of literature, they are quite comically unalike. Gillies' is a pleasant gossip about a figure on the fringe of significant history, while Lukacs' is a sledge-hammer demonstration of the whole meaning of life and man's chief end, of what real significance and history are. It is Gillies who has the footnotes—several hundreds of them—but his real spirit is conveyed by the cover, a 1650 engraving of Weimar, and by the old-fashioned elegance, the high-necked typography and the slim-volume format, which Blackwells has given him. His biography of James Macdonald is a very British book; history is a repository of striking personalities and anecdotes, whose relation to the present is essentially comfortable, a pastoral domain. Lukacs is described on the cover of his book as a "sovereign" critic, "the most important" and "the most respected," and his criticism is said to be "muscular." The emphasis is all on *power;* and even the crudities of translation and faults of proofreading seem to express an impatience with the servile and cringing arts of correctness. Neither book is well written, in any sense of the word. But Gillies is just inefficient, pottering on across time and space, retracing its steps, losing our way for us among all the different Macdonalds, and tying up each new figure with so many trivial relationships to the famous ("His second wife's aunt was that Flora Macdonald who . . .") that they stand before us as stiffly beribboned as at a fancy-dress ball. While Lukacs is all severity and abstraction, except for the unpleasantly fawning, lackeylike citations of Marx and Engels. A casual phrase of Marx about the "honest thoughts" of the *young* Schelling is brought in twice, to justify Lukacs' quoting Schelling on his side.

The contrast is comic in that each brings out the weaknesses of the other. Obviously Lukacs brings out the nonseriousness of Gillies, the anti-disciplinary character of British humanism. But his own performance is vulnerable to the question, "What is all this in aid of? What literary purpose is served, what literary insights elicited, by all this muscularity?" Lukacs has a high reputation, and one can indeed see here, in scattered paragraphs, that he writes with a powerful mind. Certainly the *Faust* studies at the end of this book have some interesting ideas to put forward. Yet they are all ideas *about* literature—the relations between classicism and the Marxist interpretation of history, for instance; a parallel between *Faust* and the *Phenomenology of Mind;* and one between *Minna von Barnhelm* and Mozart. These are obviously highly speculative and nonsystematic ideas, despite the elaborate machinery of the dialectic and the severity of the style. Often, moreover, these ideas have only paradoxical interest. They are worth thinking about—for a few minutes—just because their plausibility can be so clearly and firmly denied. Thus his main proposition about *Wilhelm Meister* is that it expresses the ideals of the French Revolution. Quite apart from the dubiousness of personifying such a complex phenomenon so simply, there can surely be no more than paradoxical truth in associating that manifesto of aristocratic self-culture with, let's say, Robespierre. Above all, these ideas remain *about* the books, they never lead you *into* them, or leave you alone inside them.

Lukacs' essays were written mostly in the thirties, except the *Faust* studies of the forties, and in those decades they would have been much more impressive to read. The traditions of 19th-century bourgeois humanism and the distortions of Nazism were then enemies worth fighting against. But he did not give enough of himself to the books he was writing about, did not subdue his preconceptions to them sufficiently, to achieve truth. We are left with no vivid sense of Goethe, or even of Lukacs' sense of Goethe. He assimilated himself to Soviet communism, in all its crudities and brutalities. He *was* Soviet communism, in the realm of literary studies; he acquired some of his impressiveness from that likeness; and he must now suffer a similar depreciation.

James Macdonald (1772-1810) grew up in the Hebrides and spoke only Gaelic until he was 12. He was trained for the ministry and became a tutor to boys of noble Scottish family whom he accompanied to Germany and most par-

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ticularly to Weimar. He became a friend of Wieland and Herder, and a faithful correspondent of K. A. Böttiger, the headmaster of the Weimar Gymnasium, and later the editor of two of the most important literary-intellectual periodicals of the time, the *Neuer Deutsche Merkur* and the *Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung*. Macdonald wrote pieces about Scotland for these papers, and pieces about Germany for the *Edinburgh Review*. He spread the fame of Wieland and Herder in Edinburgh, and of Burns and Ossian in Weimar.

This sort of cultural mediator is important in literary history, yet often neglected and understandably so. Macdonald was not a very interesting critic. He had a certain pungency of phrase, but his opinions are not only predictable, they are in the significant sense defensive. The only person he risks taking a strong line against is Kant, feeling secure in the support of both Scottish commonsense philosophy, and the anti-Kantianism of Wieland and Herder. But of Goethe and Schiller too he speaks without enthusiasm; they were never *his* Germans. His literary taste was as typically liberal as his politics, which change from radical to conservative step by step in rhythm with the events in Paris and London. In principle he liked the new authors, but in practice he preferred the most backward-looking ones among them, the Wielands rather than the Goethes.

We could as properly call him a typical Edinburgh intellectual for this, as a typical liberal. After the death of Hume, Edinburgh had no really bold minds, though it was still the Athens of the North, outshining London, Oxford and Cambridge. Edinburgh's greatest period preceded Weimar's, and perhaps it was only the accident of Britain's isolation during the Napoleonic wars which rekindled its flame. For instance, Sydney Smith's stay in Edinburgh, without which there might never have been an *Edinburgh Review*, was an accident of war. He had set out, with a pupil, for Weimar, but the Continent becoming closed to him, took the road to Scotland as the next best alternative. It is in part the relation between the two cities that is so interesting. The two torches fed each other. Edinburgh gave Weimar much of the Shaftesbury ideal of the harmonious personality; Weimar, or rather Goethe, gave Scott the clue to the Waverley novels, in the form of "Götz von Berlichingen." Edinburgh and Weimar were the two great culture cities of the period, the two great centers of education in every sense of that word. The career of James Macdonald reflects the cultural flow that existed between these two centers of intellectual life; for that reason alone it is worth recommending Macdonald to your attention.

Learning About China

ORVILLE SCHELL

Mr. Schell is senior fellow at the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California. He is co-author, with Franz Schurmann, of The China Reader *(Random House).*

In the last ten years the United States has become increasingly aware of China. Sadly, however, this new awareness has not grown out of a fascination and concern for a nation which has chosen to modernize in a way unfamiliar to us. American interest in China, long smothered by our sense of betrayal at the "loss of China" to the Communists, by McCarthyism and by the Korean War, has been revived out of fear of that country and the threat which it is said to pose to our own national security. We study China, not because it is instructive and interesting as we might study Western Europe or our own history but because it is an enemy. It has been assumed that China, by nature of being Communist, cannot be other than our enemy.

It has been in terms of our urgent need to understand an implacable foe that China has been presented to high school students learning about Asia for the first time. The country is dehumanized and treated as a crippling disease. The message is simple: every good American has an obligation to understand the nature of this threat before it is too late. As Hsün-Tzu said in the second century B.C.: "Know your enemy in a thousand battles, and win a thousand victories." Understanding China as a "threat" becomes confused with understanding China.

As our policy makers, increasingly concerned with "Chinese Aggression," encourage our educators to offer more courses on Asia in high schools and colleges, a multitude of committees, research centers, curriculum projects and conferences on China have been set up, by both government and private foundations. A tidal wave of books and other materials on China has been produced in recent years. While some have been insightful, most books and pamphlets published for use in secondary school world history courses, which often include sections on Asia, have been dismayingly poor. Writing intelligent and intelligible books for high school students has been a task eschewed by most blue ribbon "China experts" as unscholarly and unprestigious. The assumption seems to be that nothing of real interest or importance about a place as complex as China could be understood by students with little or no background. In any event, high school books do not serve to advance one's academic career in any field. And although some Asian specialists have attached their names to texts as "consulting specialists," the quality of these texts remains embarrassingly low. One suspects that their interest in such books has been more for lucre than love of educating the young.

Until recently the task of explaining China to teen-agers has fallen to a random assortment of second-string cold warriors. Usually only marginally familiar with China studies, these writers pass the old perceptions of China, formed in the fifties, on to the young like a congenital disease. A sample survey of some of their work goes a long way toward explaining why so many Americans, exposed to this and similar material, still understand China in as distorted a fashion as they do.

One of the most popular paperbacks on China for the high school market, *The Two Chinas*, by Oliver Bell, M.A. (Oxon), published in 1962 and reissued in 1967, is advertised on its fold-out back flap as belonging to a series called the Scholastic World Affairs Multi Texts, each of which "contains everything the student needs to know about geography, history, arts, economy, government, people and international relations of one of the important areas of the world. Written from both an American and a global viewpoint, each book shows how important that area is to the future welfare and national interest of the U.S." Education unabashedly assumes the burden of preparing young Americans for the global struggle. By the time Bell begins his second chapter, "A Wide Land, a Teeming People" (must every student be taught that China's people are "teeming," that China is a "hungry," "restless," "slumbering dragon," an "anthill," or an "awakened giant"?), he has divided the world up into US and THEM. He uses adjectives such as "ruthless" constantly to score the Chinese while our humanitarianism in "restraining Chinese Communist aggression" is unfailingly writ large.

In a later chapter entitled "China's Aggressive Policies," under the subtitle, "Aggression and Expansion," Bell writes that "China has used its military power aggressively to widen its sphere of influence. From Korea in the North, to Vietnam in the South and Tibet in the West, China's armed strength has advanced the Communist cause." Such statements are made as a matter of fact, totally ignoring much recent scholarship re-evaluating China's involvement in all of these apparently incriminating conflicts. "Aggression," like so many other terms, does not seem to warrant deeper

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consideration and definition. What does "spreading communism" mean? Is he talking about foreign aid, espionage, invading armies, weapons sales or just the spread of ideas? He is never explicit.

Bell sees only two kinds of countries in Asia: Communist and non-Communist. There are no dictatorships, no oligarchies, no democracies, no Socialist states. The "free world" is apparently free of such ambiguities. For instance, Taiwan (the "other China") is described as "an outpost of the free world in the Pacific" in which "President Chiang Kai-shek dominates the government. He or his close advisors make all important decisions." But, "within these limitations, democratic institutions operate fairly well in Taiwan." Is he referring to the legislative Yuan (the "Republic of China's" National Assembly) whose members have not been elected since Chiang was expelled from the mainland some twenty years ago?

Bell talks about China's threat to us, but little about our threat to China. It must appear to a questioning student that China's foreign policy is either made in a vacuum or in the minds of irrational leaders. Do the Chinese have a "national interest"? Is there any reason for them to fear encirclement or attack just as we do? Bell would probably say no, for he does not entertain the notion that another nation might fear the United States as aggressive. Aggressiveness is their sickness, not ours.

Bell's discussion of the Chinese internal revolution is also incomplete, and does very little to help a student understand the dynamics of social change in a backward country. He notes that before 1949 the Nationalists had "ceased to be forward looking" and that "corruption and graft became widespread. The Government did little to help the peasants, who remained poor and oppressed by the landlords." Such facts are presented to the student, but devoid of the revolutionary conclusions that they imply. Bell does not show the causal connection between "oppression," "graft," "corruption," and revolution. This connection is extremely important, and no revolution can be made intelligible without it. If it is missed, one ends up with Bell, explaining revolution in terms of a series of unfortunate problems "skillfully exploited" by means of propaganda by crafty Communists. The revolution sounds like a *coup d'état* which is the product of the Chinese Communists having "fastened their rule on China." Bell does not convey to the student the sense of absolute hopelessness and despair felt by most Chinese during and after World War II as they watched their country disintegrate under the Nationalists. Nor does he convey the sense that profound revolutionary changes (Communist or otherwise) were inevitable in China, and that legitimate grievances justified the cause of revolution in the eyes of most Chinese. The final struggle between the Communists and the Nationalists is portrayed by Bell as a kind of gamelike struggle between A and B. What is important is that *we* were rooting for B, not the differing social programs and interest groups represented by each side. Bell typically decries the violence (i.e., land reform and the execution of landlords) of the revolution. But he fails to show the deep institutionalized violence of the whole economic and social system which kept the Nationalists in power while millions starved each year. A revolution, which is not put into its social context where the antagonists are shown to represent different social classes and different social visions, must seem pointless and wasteful to a student trying to understand it. He must indeed be perplexed by the ardor and commitment with which millions of people struggled to death against their own countrymen.

Bell concludes with a few lines apparently designed to relieve the consciences of any students still troubled by our hostile relationship with the Chinese:

> It is tragic that the triumph of communism in China should have caused that great nation and the U.S. to become enemies. We have had a long history of friendly relations. The American people sympathize with the Chinese people's desire for a better way of life, and in other circumstances would gladly have helped them attain it. . . .

Perry Chang of the Economics Department of Northern Illinois University has written a booklet called *China: Development by Force* for Curriculum Resources Inc., and published by Scott, Foresman. Although he is Chinese, he views China very much through the eyes of a Westerner for whom "economic development" is the only really important criterion of national development. He measures the success and failure of Communist China by the familiar standards used to judge the health of Western capitalist countries, namely, per capita income and consumption. He laments the fact that in modern China, investment capital created by "forced savings" is accumulated at the expense of consumption and personal freedom. But how else could a nation as backward and decimated by war as China was in 1949 accumulate investment capital? Chang uses Taiwan as an alternative and more successful model. Investment capital came primarily from U.S. aid. And the United States is not about to set up an AID office in Peking. Although Chang admits that forced saving ". . . is a desperate method reserved only for a poor country that cannot raise capital from other sources," the fact that China is poor and has no real alternative does not lead him to put the issue of Communist Chinese forced savings in a more sympathetic light.

But there is a deeper and more serious blindness in Chang's kind of analysis. Economics are of course an extremely important part of the whole Chinese revolution. But social development plays an equally important part in Mao's vision of a revolutionary society. In the simplest terms this means the destruction of class lines and social inequalities. It means organic social change, the destruction of all traditionally oppressive social relationships such as those between landlord-peasant, father-son, man-wife, city worker-country farmer, gentry-common man and educated-uneducated. It also means the destruction of traditional values such as the veneration of the past and the aged instead of the new and the young, the quest for harmony and tranquillity rather than struggle and change, and respect for leisure rather than manual labor. These goals are all just as vital to Mao as increasing GNP, upping the growth rate or per capita consumption. While they are also prerequisites for economic development, Mao sees them as good and necessary in themselves. Unless a student is able to evaluate as goals in themselves the collectivization, communization or the *hsia-fang* movement (in which city people were sent into the countryside to work, where no doubt they were not always paradigms of competence), much of the Chinese revolution will not make sense.

China is not the United States nor is it trying to be like the United States. Mao does not share the visions, social

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and economic, of Richard Nixon and Lyndon Johnson. If we want to help students understand how the Chinese see themselves and the world, Chinese development must be examined in terms of Chinese goals and values. Only through understanding Maoist theory from the inside can we expect to find logic and reason in events as seemingly irrational to Americans as the Great Leap Forward and the Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

A third booklet, *The Chinese Dilemma*, funded by a Ford Foundation grant to the Foreign Relations Project, is part of a series of "experimental" units put out by a Midwestern group called the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools. The author, John Armstrong, who has worked in Burma and Indonesia with a Johns Hopkins teaching group in the 1950s, and who has "traveled widely through Southeast Asia, Europe and Central America," would seem qualified to be writing on China. His title, *The Chinese Dilemma*, bespeaks the kind of cold-war *Weltanschauung* which informs the entire work. From his point of view, the impasse between the United States and China is seen simply as the product of unexplained Chinese belligerence; we have done little to deserve such opposition; there is no dilemma at home, only in China. China is portrayed as a crazed, hostile, aggressive, immature child driving its mature, reasonable, law-abiding humanitarian parent (the United States) to the end of its patience. Like exasperated parents who refuse to acknowledge their own involvement in their problem child's behavior, Armstrong absolves the United States of almost all responsibility in the historical formation of China's hostility to us.

He talks of "Chinese pride" and how the Chinese were "subject to political and social humiliation at the hands of the West. . . ." And yet these considerations figure little in his final analysis of the struggle going on between the United States and China today. For instance, he makes no mention of how the West brought opium to China in the 19th century against Chinese protestations in a successful attempt to create a favorable balance of trade. He calls the Opium Wars (1938-42) the "First Anglo-Chinese War." This convenient evasion of facts about the introduction of opium into China would sting the pride of almost any Chinese, especially since China lost that war and every other war with the West since.

There is a failure here to see history through Chinese eyes. The Chinese have historically held an animosity for the West, but they have lacked the power and self-confidence to demonstrate it visibly. And thus it is assumed that the Chinese were "friends of America" until the Communists destroyed all that in 1949. There is an unexplained gap between the good old days of Sino-American friendship and present times when China is ruled by an " 'American hating Chinese dictatorship' which is stirring up trouble around Red China's borders [with] . . . communist methods of subversion . . . too well known to warrant discussion here."

I am sure bright students must wonder: why all this hate? Why all the strident talk directed against the United States and imperialism? Are the Chinese crazy? Armstrong provides few answers. He does not allow history to be used as a framework for the present. He attaches little significance, for example, to the fact that men like Mao Tse-tung have spent their whole lives fighting foreigners or governments backed by foreigners. Armstrong's explanation of Chinese antagonism is sophomoric: "ruthless inspired leadership transformed a battered and disheartened people by means of propaganda, persuasion, and force, into a vigorous and dedicated engine that did the bidding of its masters." One wonders why Chiang Kai-shek, try as he might, could not do the same.

Similarly, Armstrong's approach to China's social revolution, like Bell's, is ahistorical. The terrible misery of the Chinese peasant is mentioned, but not used to explain why so many people in the countryside supported land reform and the Communists when they came. Armstrong talks of the replacement of one government by another. He makes Mao and his coterie of Yenan comrades indistinguishable from a Latin American military junta. But what of the transformation of a whole society? The social dynamics of the Chinese revolution have been overlooked. The Chinese are portrayed as violating and ignoring their interests rather than fulfilling them.

All three of these books have a problem in common which seems typical of the treatment of China in general at the high school level. China's place in the world is not explored in a dialectical fashion. Students do not get the very important message that in studying China, we are also studying ourselves; that much of what China has professed or done has been in reaction to what we have professed or done. The United States and China are locked into a circle of action and reaction, and neither side is intelligible without the other. Our bogy man is communism: their bogy man is imperialism. We each end up afraid of the other out of all proportion to the threat actually posed. Neither side understands why it is felt to be a threat to the other, and thus actions or reactions on both sides seem all the more irrational and menacing.

But there is no reason why high school education need continue reinforcing this doomed cycle. A new generation of Asian scholars (many of them motivated by concern over the war in Vietnam) are beginning to teach and write. It is true that there is probably nothing that can be done to effect a radical change in the ideas of the present U.S.-China establishment. But one need not despair. Like China's greatest contemporary writer, Lu Hsün, in the 1920s long after he had given up hope that the older generation (his own) could save his confused country, one can cry out, "save the children!"

FILMS

ROBERT HATCH

With *The Lost Man* (originally *Odd Man Out*) following upon *Up Tight* (originally *The Informer*) one may hazard the emergence of a trend to transpose the conditions of the Irish struggle for independence into those of black militancy. One can understand why film makers are attracted by this notion: the parallels work out in a rough sort of way, and the IRA generated some first-class drama that can be given an exhilarating rebirth in the American ghettos. I'm not sure, though, that it should go on much longer. Popular theatre does not operate in a social vacuum, and tensions are already sufficiently high without encouraging a general supposition that the blacks are forming themselves into a national underground army for the purposes of terrorism and the eventual seizure of power. The goal of the IRA was to drive the British from Ireland; how far do we want to press that parallel for the purpose of entertainment?

As might be expected from their respective origins and makers, *The Lost Man* contains considerably less black power rhetoric than did *Up Tight*. *The Informer* was a tragedy about the revolution; *Odd Man Out* was a melodrama with the revolution as background. Jules Dassin is a more intensely social-minded director than Robert Alan Aurthur, and Julian Mayfield, star of *Up Tight*, is close to the movement, whereas, as far as I know, Sidney Poitier, star of *The Lost Man*, is not.

Indeed, the latter film should, and I hope will, be taken as simply a superb amusement, relying on one of the screen's most skillful of suspense plots and contributing fine performances by Poitier, most particularly by Al Freeman, Jr.,

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as his reluctant henchman (he believes in protest and confrontation, not in heisting payrolls for the "cause") and a generally compelling cast. The acting level is far superior to that of *Up Tight*; comparisons at a distance are tricky, but *The Lost Man* is probably at least as well performed as *Odd Man Out*. However, its color photography is not in the same class with Carol Reed's black and white.

In all, very refreshing entertainment—as long as people don't take it into their heads that there exists an "organization" on whose behalf Negroes of high moral purpose are prepared to rob and kill. Incidentally, I suspect that the black militants will not be happy about the interracial relationship played by Poitier and Joanna Shimkus, though it is moving and done with great dignity.

For *The Wild Bunch*, Sam Peckinpah has rediscovered something that I suspect was known to the Elizabethans: if you carry violence far enough, the audience will laugh. In this most expansive, and indeed most artful, eye-filling and mind-boggling of Westerns, men, women and children die in hecatombs; not once but twice a whole town is wiped out; the slaughter is utterly indiscriminate, a handful of desperadoes on either side cutting down the population to get at one another. The director has also picked up, possibly from *Bonnie and Clyde*, the device of showing the actual instant of annihilation in slow motion, so that scenes of hysterical activity are constantly punctuated by floating, dreamlike vignettes of death. And finally, he has decided, on what medical authority I do not know, that when hit by a bullet the human body bursts like a ripe melon.

At all this the audience laughed (and so did I), not with merriment, exactly, but in tribute to such virtuosity of gore. Any excess is a kind of joke. I know what moral indignation I should express at this unrestrained violence—the words almost write themselves—but in fact I don't feel that way. It may well be that Peckinpah is making a point on "our" side—saying that it is no good showing the likes of the American public an orderly duel or rationally limited casualties, that America is the new Rome and its arenas must be red to the brim. I did think, though, that the outrage displayed by the Yankee outlaws of the film at the cruelty of some Mexican revolutionary irregulars was misplaced. I shared their revulsion but thought they were hardly the ones to express it. The real moral offense of the picture is the implication that an Anglo-Saxon, no matter how wolfish, is a model of compassion when compared to a Mex. The Wild West is a historical amusement, but racism is not.

For the rest, *The Wild Bunch* is superb scenery, splendid riding, ingenious and reasonably plausible criminality, involving outlaws, bounty hunters, Mexican villages and their ravening exploiters, the intercontinental railroad and the U.S. Army. A picturesque cast is led by William Holden, Ernest Borgnine and Robert Ryan. American movies, when they deal with rough life in the range country can look marvelous—the detail authentic, the performers incredibly adept, the dialogue crisp (and now with the new tolerance they can even talk more like ruffians than like scout leaders). Of course, this kind of film has almost no content, only incident, but that is true also of ballet. Like any well-designed Western, *The Wild Bunch* is the choreography of our most persistent legend.

Except that its promoters have found in the reviews some enticing quotes, I would not mention *The Boys of Paul Street*. It is such a terrible film that it seems almost unfair to pan it. A cast of English boys, directed by Zoltan Fabri, who evidently has no idea of how boys look or sound, is set to staging a mock war in a Budapest lumberyard around 1900. The story (incredibly attributed to a novel by Ferenc Molnar) is mawkish and self-righteous; the acting is stupefying (children miserably aping their elders); the dialogue can scarcely be uttered by human mouths. *The Boys of Paul Street* is being pushed as an anti-war film; it is an anti-audience film.

GLENVILLE SHOOT-OUT *(Continued from page 45)*

righteousness toward those attempting to put pressure on the county prosecutor rings hollow.

Judge McMonagle said to Evans after the conviction: "Now if it can be said there was any defense that you presented or interposed as far as this case is concerned, it was that you did not agree with *our* laws, and apparently you were not bound by them. . . ." He charged that Evans had "caused really a dreadful and awesome state actually to exist in our community and nation. You know, actually before we had this Glenville incident, that has been adjudicated as caused really by you, there was never any open display of firearms by youngsters. Now boys of the same age as your followers and who are, however, college students, now feel that apparently it is the proper thing to do and the legal thing to do, to have a show of rifles, shotguns and bandoliers; basically these children are really emulating the example you set as part of the incident which is now coming to a conclusion."

Evans, who did not testify, said to the court: "This will not end by the means that have been used today against the black men who are willing, who are able, who are strong enough to stand up. The electric chair or fear of anything won't stop the black men of today." He said that he was not a murderer, adding, however: "I want it fully understood by all the men that I have known and all the people whom I have associated with, that they are on the right path; because when you are on the right path to righteousness in a world such as we now live in, you are bound to run into opposition, the likes of this."

The Civil Violence Center report concluded that the Glenville battle may have "marked the beginning of a new pattern" away from black violence against property to "violence aimed at personal injury." Its failure, however, to put the same test to the motivations and actions of white policemen at the outset of the conflict opens the report to criticisms of reaching the conclusions it set out to find, if not of succumbing to a racist view of violence. This is suggested by its failure to examine the implications of escalating white violence, despite gory accounts of it in the report. The desire to measure the rise of black violence may produce a self-fulfilling theory as each new black-white confrontation is tested by the question, "Is this an escalation of the black revolution?" Black violence may escalate, and if it does one may be sure that the state and the courts will not condone it. But with the results of the Ahmed Evans case before us, one cannot be so sure of the same opposition to white violence.

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ART

LAWRENCE ALLOWAY

To be a collector of Western art at the Kennedy Galleries does not mean you have to have a taste for Renaissance bronzes, Dutch genre painting, or English landscapes. Here Western art means cowboys and/or Indians on the plains and mountains of the American West in the 19th century. The gallery specializes in the art of the West so defined. With the present amplification of American art history, until recently fragmentary and amateur, Western Scene art has become of increasing interest. It is one of several styles, parallel or tangential to the received outline of recent art history. It is already very expensive, as high in price as Abstract Expressionism, sometimes higher.

Western Scene art is far more extensive than has been generally noticed. There are broadly three main phases: the first, somewhat tentative, exploratory phase treats the Indians in terms of exotic documentary. One of the artists is George Heriot, who described his subject as "the habits of savage life"; another is George Catlin (the best of all the Western artists) who said of the Indians: "they are a dying nation who have no historians." (Both quotations are from the "Kennedy Quarterly," an essayistic catalogue published by the gallery.) Heriot's scenes have links back to the Baroque fantasizing of 18th-century anthropological illustrations (which lagged far behind the literary description of alien societies). Catlin changed this, not so much by his power of formal invention as by the weight of his sympathetic sense of fact.

The second and main phase of sophisticated genre scenes and sublime landscape views belongs historically to the second half of the 19th century. It extends into the 20th century, until about World War I. A theme of great interest in this phase, well shown in the present exhibition, is the annexation of European modes and their transformation here. Probably the best Western Scene painter of this phase is Albert Bierstadt who revised the forest and mountain imagery of German romantic landscape to depict the other West. Arthur Fitzwilliam Tait, one of the artists who provided Currier and Ives with raw material, in the form of paintings, translated the iconography of British sporting art into the new environment: red skins take the place of red hunting coats in his episodes of ambush, chase and death.

The total of such modifications of European art amounted to a major shift. Changes in the thing contained (the subject) gradually altered the form of the container (the work of art). Thus a painting like Frederic Remington's "Comanche Brave. Fort Reno, Indian Territory," 1888, a profile portrait of a rider, is Americanized by its forthright detailing of native gear, its well-observed non-European riding posture, and by its pervasive, but non-impressionistic (i.e., non-experimental) plein-airism.

Western Scene art was international, not only because of its borrowings but in the use made of its subjects by European artists. For example, Paul Troubetskoy, a Russian sculptor in Paris, turned Don Quixote into cowboys, and another sculptor Carl Dauba, cast many of his spiky bronze Indian equestrians in Vienna. Those artists who can be described unequivocally as American, such as Cyrus E. Dollin, maintained some European traces: the form of his Noble Savage sculptures, for instance, have the placidity of overweight neo-classicism.

As European genre was stretched to cover American subjects two things happened: the choice of subjects became increasingly topical and contemporaneous and their treatment ever more dramatic and spectacular. In Europe, genre painting, even when devoted to scenes of military action, tended to remain within the bounds of fine art. (Battle art had precedents going back at least to 16th-century Venetian ceiling paintings.) In America not only did many painters work for magazines but their paintings were partially shaped by the popular iconography of the works done for mass reproduction. Thus Charles Russell's "Indian Maiden" is as much pin-up as symbol, despite an iconographical hint traceable back to Delacroix's personifications of Greece and, perhaps, Liberty. Minor artists like Jules Tavernier and Charles Graham did not fundamentally differentiate the stylistics of their paintings from that of their illustrations for *Harper's Weekly*. American artists achieved easily the "modernity" that Baudelaire conferred on Constantine Guys, that ability to combine topical sensibility with a humanistic fund of knowledge.

The overlapping of fine art and popular culture is a recurrent feature of American art. The early 20th-century Ash Can school, for example, as grittily urban as the Western Scene artists were frontier-conscious, depended largely on painters with experience as newspaper illustrators. Social protest themes of the 1930s are common to (public) murals and (public) graphics, as well as to the traditionally more personal, more restricted form of easel painting. American Pop art, more than most of its European forms, has benefited from contacts between fine art and popular culture, in this case with comics, advertisements and pin-ups serving as the artists' subjects.

A fair quantity of contemporary Western Scene art and pieces of this third phase is presented by the Kennedy Galleries on equal terms with work of the two earlier phases. In a way, why not? They are the same, except for their flashy virtuosity and labored nostalgia. The weakness of the new work is its dependence on the second phase as classic. As a result, there is in the new work a degree of revivalism that approaches ghost-writing in its abject effacement of original sensibility. The artists are all in reservations now and we know what that does to a man.

The iconography of the great, ebullient second phase has not been lost, but it must be sought in another medium, the movies. (I understand movies to include, in this context, TV Westerns which are, of course, always filmed.) The easy exchange between fine art and pop culture, as it developed through the 19th century, has ceased to be a two-way function in Western Scene art. It was still working before World War I, however, when Charles Russell's paintings and Thomas H. Ince's movies were contemporaneous. Their coexistence prepares us for the fact that the present inheritors of Bierstadt and Remington, Alfred Jacob Miller and Paul Kane, are John Ford and Delmer Daves, Budd Boetticher and Sergio Leone, movie directors and not painters and sculptors at all.

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Crossword Puzzle No. 1306

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

ACROSS

1 Giving out affection, in a spirit of co-operation? (4-2-5)
9 Show up? Quite the opposite to indicate something less than enthusiasm. (4,4)
10 Evidently not a single shot fired! (6)
11 Naturally they aren't liked, being dust-gatherers commonly. (7)
12 Shield. (7)
14 Built like a bird behind! (6)
15 One might make such a pan hot in response. (8)
17 The fabric you pick out might be significant. (8)
20 Tipped—with money, of course! (6)
22 Within range of vision or understanding? (7)
24 Caught slumped around the pole? (7)
26 One ointment about as backward as another! (6)
27 What an Italian road sign might say with a complaint descriptive of 26. (8)
28 What Friday's marketplace might have is somewhat apart from the rest. (11)

DOWN

2 This might be a military order to turn back, in time. (2,3,4)
3 Act purposefully, else a person might stand at the entrance. (7)
4 See 25 down
5 Animal always allowed outside? (7)
6 Certainly not a lady's man! (5)
7 Staple and fold with them? (6)
8 Sound on sound, in three choruses. (6)
13 See 25 down
16 Sips lager brewed for those in a reflective mood? (4,5)
18 Flower book, probably dated. (6)
19 Certainly not like 3, with no way to get in. (7)
20 The quarterback might, with the worker on holiday. (4,3)
21 Some medicines are, to quote yours truly in retrospect. (6)
23 The fashionable crowd, perhaps, include just a small picture within the framework. (5)
25, 4 and 13 down Roman writer with a number of stories, according to sound method of punishment. (3-1-4-5)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1305

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

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